Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

Five F L.L.C v. Heritage Savings : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian W. Steffensen; Steffensen Law Office; attorneys for appellant.
James S. Jardine, Brent D. Wride, Elaina M. Maragakis; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; George W. Pratt;
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough; attorneys for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Five F L.L.C v. Heritage Savings, No. 20020088 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3671

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FIVE F, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

No. 20020088-CA

v.
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee

Appeal from Judgment Entered by
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County,
the Honorable J. Phillip Eves

Brian W. Steffensen
STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE
2159 South 700 East Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Elaina M. Maragakis
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
George W. Pratt
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
170 South Main Street #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
3
Patjfelta £L.rn

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FIVE F, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

No. 20020088-CA

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee

Appeal from Judgment Entered by
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County,
the Honorable J. Phillip Eves

Brian W. Steffensen
STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE
2159 South 700 East Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Elaina M. Maragakis
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
George W. Pratt
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
170 South Main Street #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

2

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

14

ARGUMENT

15

I.

THE LAW IMPOSES NO DUTY ON A TRUST DEED
BENEFICIARY TO BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PARCEL AT THE FORECLOSURE SALE
A.
B.

II.

The Operation Of Utah's Trust Deed Statute Provides A WellDefined Procedure For Foreclosure, Which Heritage Followed

15

Utah's Trust Deed Statute Does Not Impose Any Duty On A
Beneficiary To Bid Fair Market Value At A Foreclosure Sale

J7

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ANY OF FIVE F'S
UNPRECEDENTED THEORIES THAT HERITAGE HAD A DUTY
TO BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE AT THE FORECLOSURE
SALE
A.

15

21

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of Its
Status As Trustee
21
1.

The Trustee-Trustor Relationship, Standing Alone, Does
Not Create A Fiduciary Duty
a.

b.
2.

21

Five F Presented No Evidence At Trial To Meet
The Banberry Criteria For A Fiduciary
Relationship

22

Five F's Reliance On Blodgett Is Misplaced

24

Even If Heritage, As Trustee, Had A Fiduciary Duty,
That Duty Did Not Require Heritage To Bid Fair Market
ii

Value At The Foreclosure Sale
B.
C.

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value As A Result
Of Its Joint Status As A Trustee And Beneficiary

27

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of
The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing

27

1.

Heritage, as Beneficiary, Did Not Have An Obligation To
Exercise An Express Contract Right To Its Detriment.
28

2.

Five F Could Have No Reasonable Expectation That
Heritage Would Bid The Fair Market Value Of The
Parcel
a.

D.

Heritage Did Not Have A Duty To Bid The Full
Amount of the Debt or Otherwise Extinguish It

2.

3.

34

Five F Is Barred From Raising This Issue On Appeal
Because It Did Not Raise This Issue At Trial
..

35

Heritage's Foreclosure Of Its Collateral Is Not A
Deficiency Judgment Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32
Because It Is Not An "Action."

37

Heritage's Foreclosure Of Additional Collateral Was Not
The Pursuit Of A Deficiency Judgment Because Heritage
Did Not Seek A Personal Judgment Against An
Individual
40

FIVE F'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER
OF LAW
A.

29

The Foreclosure Process Followed By Heritage Is Not The Legal
Equivalent Of A Deficiency Judgment
34
1.

III.

25

Unjust Enrichment Is Not Available Where There Is A Contract
Claim

SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED

42
42
44

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah
1996)

43

Bank ofChenoa v. Bagby, 467 N.E.2d 596 (111. Ct. App.)

.

38

Benavides v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. Bank, 433 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1993)

26

Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ^ 14, 993 P.2d 875

19

Boatmen's Bank of Pulaski Co. v. Wilson, 833 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)

30

Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991)

28, 29

Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425)

34

CrosslandMortgage Corp. v. Frankel, 596 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Dev. 2nd. Dept.
1993)

26

Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, 11 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2000)

31, 38, 40, 41

First Comm. Mortgage v. Reece, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 23 (Cal. Ct. App. Div. 3 2001)

34

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah
1989)
'
21, 22, 23, 24, 25
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Development Corporation, 786 P.2d
1326 (Utah 1990)
23
First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)

17, 25

FiveF, L.L.C. v. Heritage SavingsBank,No. 981461 (August 12, 1998)

12

Frontier Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Douglass, 853 P.2d 553 (Id. 1993)

26

Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996)

23

Hatch v. Security-First Nat 7 Bank, 19 Cal.2d 254, 262 (1942)

38

Hodges v. Mark, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
Jones v. Loosle, 2001 WL 311195 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)

38, 41
36

Lysenko v. Sawaya, 973 P.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1999) aff'd, 1 P.3d 783 (Utah 2000).......... 42
iv

Management Comm. ofGraystone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n v. Graystone Pines,
Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982))
Merino v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999).......

1
1

Mylesv. Cox, 217So.2d31 (Miss. 1968)

26

New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 630 A.2d 1010 (Conn. 1993)

....31

Olbres v. Hampton Cooperative Bank, 698 A.2d 1239 (N.H. 1997)

31

Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174 (Utah 1991)

3.7, 38, 40

Smith v. JwAa«,311F.2d670(10 th Cir. 1962)

16,26

Sorenson's Ranch Sch. v. Oram,200\ UT App 354, ^ 11, 36 P.3d 528

19

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

36

Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

16, 26

Turnbaugh v. Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d 940 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

1

Virginia Housing Dev p Auth. v. Fox Run Ltd. Partnership, 497 S.E.2d 747 (Va.
1998)

34

Willett v. Herrick, 155 N.E. 589 (Mass. 1927

23

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3)
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998)

4, 15
2

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23

16

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998)

2, 3, 7, 10, 16, 18, 19, 26

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-29

11,28

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32

1, 3, 17, 18, 19, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (1996)

1

Other Authorities
3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Secured Transactions in Real
Property § 162)

41

Black's Law Dictionary at 379

41

David A. Thomas and James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real
Property Law 773-74, 782-85 (1999)
ADDENDUM INDEX
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998)

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998)

C.

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32(1998)

D.

Court's RulingR 1826 at 846:14—852:25

E.

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict

F.

Final Judgment

G.

Amended Proposed Pretrial Order

H.

Plaintiffs Promissory Note

I.

Plaintiffs Trust Deed

J.

Matters cited by Five F as preserving issues for appeal

vi

19

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court correctly grant a directed verdict because it

determined that, as a matter of law, Heritage Savings Bank ("Heritage") did not
have a duty to bid (or otherwise credit) the fair market value of a parcel at the
foreclosure sale?
"'This court's standard of review of a directed verdict is the same as that imposed
upon a trial court.' . . . A trial court is justified in granting a direct verdict only if,
examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor."
Merino v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999) (quotingManagement Comm.
ofGraystone Pines Homeowners Ass yn v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah
1982)). In granting the directed verdict, the trial court ruled that as a matter of law,
Heritage did not have any such duty. This legal determination is reviewed for
correctness. Turnbaugh v. Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
II.

Does sequential foreclosure of more than one piece of collateral, where

there is no deficiency action filed, come within § 57-1-32 or otherwise constitute a
deficiency action for which a fair market value is determined for the first property
foreclosed?
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Id.
1

III.

Did the lower court correctly dismiss the equitable unjust enrichment

claims because it had decided the underlying contract claim on the merits?
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS1
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998) provides, in relevant part:
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications.
(1)

(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance
company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the
United States.

(2)

The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed,
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii),
(iii), (v), or (vi).

A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 is contained in the
Addendum at Tab A.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998) provides:
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction to the
highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may conduct the sale
and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in interest, if present at the
sale, may direct the order in which the trust property shall be sold, if the property
consists of several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage
separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall follow these directions. Any
person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale.. ..

1

The determinative statutes listed here are the versions in effect during the relevant time
period, i.e., 1996-1998, copies of which are contained in the Addendum at Tab 1. All
references to statutes contained in this brief are to the versions in effect from 1996-98.
2

A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 is contained in the
Addendum at Tab B.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1998) provides:
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such
action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which
was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount by
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees in
bringing an action under this section.
A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 is contained in the
Addendum at Tab C.
NATURE OF THE CASE,2 COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION,
This case involves Heritage's sequential foreclosure of two pieces of real property
pledged by Five F under a trust deed to secure a $1.2 million loan on which Five F
defaulted. At trial, Five F claimed that Heritage, as the trust deed beneficiary, should have
bid the purported fair market value of the parcel at the first foreclosure sale so as to avoid

2

Five F's "Statement of the Case" is defective because it improperly contains numerous
factual assertions without any record citation. Because of this failure, Heritage will
respond directly only to Five F's "Statement of Facts." Further, Five F discusses in a
number of places earlier rulings of the lower court that it asserts are allegedly
inconsistent with the Court's final directed verdict ruling. (See App. Br. at 8-12.) The
purpose of Five F's discussion of these earlier rulings is puzzling since courts may
amend or change their views of the law before the end of trial, and Five F points to no
contrary authority.
3

foreclosing on a second parcel. At the conclusion of all the evidence at trial, the trial court
granted a directed verdict in favor of Heritage because there was no support for Five F's
theory of liability under the Utah trust deed statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 to -45
("Trust Deed Statute"), or Utah law.3 Five F appeals from a final judgment entered by the
Honorable J. Phillip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County on
November 29, 2001, granting a directed verdict to Heritage. (R1826 at 850:10-1.) Copies
of the relevant portion of the transcript containing the trial court's ruling (R1826 at 846:14852:25), the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict (R1791-92), and the
Final Judgment (Rl793-94), are contained in the Addendum at Tabs D, E, and F.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4
1.

Five F is a limited liability company established to develop real estate in

the St. George area. (R1823 at 28:21-24.) Ray Fowler ("Fowler") is the managing
member of Five F. (R1823 at 31:3-4; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 3.)

3

The complete absence of any legal authority for Five F's position is demonstrated by
Five F's Appellant's Brief, which contains a grand total of six case citations not one of
which addresses the issues in this case, i.e., whether Heritage had a duty to bid (or
otherwise credit) the fair market value at the foreclosure sale where no deficiency action
is filed.

4

In 27 of Five F's 37 purported facts, Five F cites only to the ''Amended Proposed
Pretrial Order, R1538." ("Proposed Order"). Because Five F regularly cites to that
Proposed Order, a copy is contained in Addendum at Tab G.
4

2.

In March of 1996, Five F5 entered into a purchase agreement with Phillip

Foremaster (the "Purchase Agreement") for 46 acres of raw land on River Road,
St. George, Utah (the "River Road Property") at a purchase price of $4.7 million. (R1823
at 29:5-12, 48:15-22.) Five F hoped to develop commercial buildings, retail space, and
other buildings on the River Road Property. (R1823 at 29:9-16.)
3.

In the Purchase Agreement, Five F agreed to pay Foremaster $10,000 down

and $10,000 per month in earnest money through August 1996, $1,114,000 on
September 15, 1996 (the "September 15 Payment"), and approximately $1,000,000 in
annual payments thereafter until the purchase price was paid in full. (R1823 at 48:2049:4.) Failure to make the September 15 Payment would result in Five F's forfeiture of
the $60,000 paid in earnest money.
4.

Throughout the summer of 1996, Five F unsuccessfully attempted to obtain

a "bridge loan" from other banks or short-term funding from brokers. (Rl 823 at 79:1780:2,95:23-96:6.)
Five Fys Loan Application to Heritage
5.

In late August 1996 Five F approached Heritage for a $1.2 million "bridge

loan" to make the September 15 Payment while seeking elsewhere permanent financing
for its River Road Property development. (Rl 823 at 29:17-30:2, 49:15-21, 80:4-9;
R1824 at 301:21-23; R1826 at 737:12-17.)

5

Net Capital Construction ("NCCC"), a company owned by Fowler, was the original
party to the Purchase Agreement. Five F succeeded to NCCC's interest. (R1823 at
52:3-10.)
5

6.

On September 5, 1996, Kerry Soper, a consultant employed by Five F,

sent a letter to Heritage on behalf of Five F (the "September 5 Letter') stating:
The loan that Ray Fowler/NCCC has requested from Heritage Savings Bank to
allow for the closing of the purchase of the subject property is truly a bridge loan
and is not intended to be long term. Our organization is 100% confident that the
larger funds needed to continue the project will be delivered as agreed and on a
timely basis.
(R1823 at 52:3-54:9, 205:17-206:24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 61.)
7.

As proposed collateral for the loan, Five F offered a 10.44 acre piece of

River Road Property (the "Parcel")6 as collateral. The Parcel was raw commercial land,
its frontage was limited, and it had an uncertain value. (1824 at 394:23-395:15.) As a
result, it was more difficult to sell than developed land. (R1824 at 395:10-11.) Given
these circumstances, Heritage's loan committee and board of directors would not approve
the loan without additional collateral, and Heritage so informed Five F. (R1823 at 86112; R1824 at 306:20-22, 394:19-395:11, 396:10-17.) Thereafter, Five F readily agreed to
pledge two four-plexes along with the Parcel as collateral to obtain the loan.7 (R1823 at
86:13-19.) Five F understood that all of the collateral pledged would be at risk if Five F
defaulted. (R1823 at 93:10-18, 211:11-13.)

6

This 10.44 acre Parcel was part of the 46 acres purchased from Foremaster which parcel
Foremaster was willing to subordinate for the Heritage loan from which he would be
paid the $1,114,000.00 September 15 Payment. (R1823 at 50:8-10.)
On September 10, 1996, in advance of making the loan Heritage ordered an appraisal on
the Parcel for the purpose of considering the loan, which came in at $1,650,000 (the
"Johnson Appraisal"). (R1824 at 307:17-25; Johnson Appraisal, Plaintiffs Exhibit 21.)
Heritage also ordered appraisals on the two four-plexes (the uRynearson Appraisals"),
each of was appraised at $306,000. (R1824 at 308:1-15; Rynearson Appraisals,
Plaintiffs Exhibits 22 and 23.)
6

The Loan Agreement and Trust Deed
8.

On September 12, 1996, Five F executed a promissory note for the

$1,200,000 loan (the CwNote"), secured by a Trust Deed With Assignment of Rents on the
Parcel and the two four-plexes (the 'Trust Deed"). (R1823 at 86:20-9, 87:25-88:5,
89:16-90:22, 92:12-23; Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2, copies of which are contained in the
Addendum at Tabs H and I.) The Note was also guaranteed by Mr. and Mrs. Fowler
individually. (Note; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 3, attached at Tab H.)
9.

Under the Note, Five F was to make payments of $10,250 on November 1

and December 1, 1996, with a payoff of the balance due on December 31, 1996.8 (Note,
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 1, attached at Tab H; R1823 at 89:1-11.)
10.

Under the Trust Deed, Heritage was the beneficiary, and Five F was the

trustor. (Trust Deed, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, attached at Tab I.) Heritage was designated as
trustee, as permitted by Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2).
Five F's Default
11.

Five F failed to pay off the Note by the due date of December 31, 1996.

(R1823 at 100:8-102:18.)
12.

On January 8, 1997, Heritage sent Five F a default notice pursuant to the

Trust Deed and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27. (R1823 at 103:23-104:6; Default Notice,
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6.)

8

The Note provided for a 5% late fee if Five F did not pay within five days of the due
date, default interest at 18% if Five F did not pay within 15 days of the due date, and
recovery of Heritage's costs and attorney fees incurred in foreclosure. (Note at 1-2,
attached at Tab H; R1823 at 89:16-90:22.)
7

13.

By letter dated February 11, 1997, Heritage agreed that if Five F paid

$240,000 on or before February 12, 1997, Heritage would release its Trust Deed lien on
one of the two four-plexes. (R1823 at 106:4-110:6; Letter dated 2/11/97, Plaintiffs
Exhibit 7.) On February 12, 1997, Five F made a $240,000 payment and, accordingly,
Heritage released its Trust Deed lien on the second four-plex. (R1823 at 109:2-110:7-9.)
Five F's Bankruptcy Filing
14.

On May 23, 1997, before Heritage could proceed to a foreclosure sale, Five

F filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs
Exhibit 28 at 8 ^ 2.1; R1823 at 112:12-15.) The bankruptcy filing effectively gave Five F
an additional year to try to obtain financing for its development or to sell the Parcel.
15.

On February 18, 1998, the bankruptcy court approved the Chapter 11 plan

proposed by Five F (the "Plan"), which provided that if Five F was unable to sell the
Parcel by May 31, 1998, Heritage could proceed with its foreclosure of the Trust Deed
properties. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs Exhibit 28 at 11 Tf 6.3; R1823
at 125:1-11.) The Plan specifically set forth the order of foreclosure: "In the event the
[Parcel] has not sold by May 31, 1998 or the Class 3 Claimant9 is not paid the allowed
amount of its claim by that date, Class 3 may continue its foreclosure proceedings on that
property in accordance with state law. In the event of such foreclosure and should Class
3 not be paid in full therefrom, Class 3 may then continue its foreclosure proceedings on
the four-plex . . . mentioned above." (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs

9

Heritage was the Class 3 claimant. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs
Exhibit 28 at 9 K 4.3.)
8

Exhibit 28 at 1 H 6.3; R1824 at 244:18-245:11; Bankruptcy Order, Defendant's Exhibit
85.)
The Foreclosure Sale on the 10.44 Acre Parcel
16.

Five F failed to pay off the loan by the May 31, 1998 deadline set in the

Plan. As a consequence, Heritage noticed the foreclosure sale of the Parcel. (R1823 at
125:1-9.)
17.

In advance of the scheduled foreclosure sale on the Parcel, Heritage sought

to "make the real estate market aware of this upcoming foreclosure" to increase the
potential of a third party buyer. (R1824 at 443:9-15.) Brian Chadaz, the President of
Heritage, "went through a directory of real estate professionals in the area, [and]
identified those individuals who themselves or perhaps [may] have clients who would be
interested in purchasing this property." (R1824 at 443:16-23.) Heritage then sent out a
letter to thirty-three individuals so identified, stating:
Heritage Savings Bank is foreclosing on a prime piece of real estate property.
Attached is a copy of a notice that will be appearing in the Spectrum periodically
prior to the foreclosure sale which will take place on July 13th, 1998. This
property is located in one of the prime commercial areas in Washington County.
If you are interested or have a client who may be interested in this property please
contact me. I would be happy to provide further information regarding this
property.
(R1824 at 444:5-446:4; Letter to Real Estate Professionals, Exhibit 90.) These efforts
went far beyond the notice requirements of the Trust Deed or the Trust Deed Statute.10

10

On April 3, 1998, three months before the sale, Heritage ordered another appraisal on
the Parcel from Morley & McConkie (the "Morley & McConkie Appraisal"), which
valued the Parcel at $1,380,000. (R1824 at 348:11-349:7; Morley & McConkie
Appraisal, Plaintiffs Exhibit 27.)
9

18.

In accordance with Section 57-1-25 of the Trust Deed Statute, Heritage

published the required notice of sale. (R1825 at 440:6-9; Notice of Sale, Defendant's
Exhibit 88.) It also ran additional advertisements of the foreclosure sale in The Spectrum
to provoke interest. (R1825 at 446:14-18; Advertisement, Defendant's Exhibit 89.)
19.

On July 13, 1998, Heritage's attorney conducted the foreclosure sale of the

Parcel. At the time of the foreclosure sale, Heritage calculated that the total amount due
and owing under the Note, including costs and attorney fees, was $1,314,685.33. (R1824
at 351:20-25.) Heritage hoped that someone else would successfully bid at the
foreclosure sale,11 but there were no bids from third parties. (R1825 at 458:4-6, 458:2122.) Heritage credit bid the amount of $1,090,000 which was the only and high bid. "
Five F was represented by Fowler at the foreclosure sale but did not bid, and did not
object to Heritage's bid. (R1823 at 125:7-25; R1824 at 257:10-12; R1825 at 457:8-17.)
20.

Pursuant to Section 57-1-27, as the high bidder, Heritage obtained full title

to the Parcel. (R1825 at 458:23-459:2.)
21.

Five F asserts, without record citation, that Heritage had "absolute

certainty" that its credit bid for the Parcel "was hundreds of thousands of dollars less than

11

A bank "invariably prefer[s] to have cash" as opposed to raw land, and Heritage hoped
a third party would bid. (R1826 at 718:19-719:2, 778:12-19.)

12

Mr. Beesley testified that in calculating Heritage's bid, "we didn't really know at that
time, have any idea at that time what that property was really worth. All we knew was
that Mr. Fowler couldn't sell it for what he owed and that nobody else wanted to buy it
that we knew of. So that was our . . . strategy. And . . . we looked at all kinds of things.
But at the end of the day we . .. structured our bids to obtain the collateral so that we
would have . . . the protection that we were offered when we made the loan. " (R1826
at 720:7-15.)
10

fair market value . .." (App. Br. at 7.) The record evidence is to the contrary. At the
time of the bid, the total amount due and owing under the Note was $1,314,685.33. {See
T| 19, supra) The most recent appraisal of the Parcel obtained by Heritage was
$1,380,000.00. {See footnote 10, supra.) Moreover, everyone in this case, including
Fowler and Five F's economic expert, Derk Rasmussen, admitted the Parcel had
uncertain value, (R1825 at 588:5-8 (Rasmussen testimony)), and was difficult to sell.
(R1826 at 830:11-831:3 (Fowler testimony).) Finally, Five F's assertion lacks reality. If
the Parcel really had excess value, then Five F, acting in its own interest, or a third party
would have bid a higher amount at the foreclosure sale and captured this purported excess
value.
22.

Pursuant to the Trust Deed Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29), the

proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied first to the foreclosure costs and then to the
outstanding debt, leaving a balance owing on the Note of approximately $229,000.
(R1824 at 261:14-20, 364:3-5; R1825 at 459:8-14.)
23.

Five F asserts that Heritage "manipulated" the Trust Deed bidding process.

(App. Br. at 14.) However, Five F never points to any step in the foreclosure sale process
which was contrary to the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed Statute, or other law. Indeed, at
the conclusion of trial, Judge Eves asked Five F"s counsel if he could point to any action
by Heritage in specific violation of the Trust Deed or statutory procedure and he
answered that he could not. (R1826 at 842:21-843:6.)13

13

The following dialogue took place at trial:
11

24.

Despite constant efforts at selling the Parcel and its own ''development"

work with the City of St. George beginning immediately after the foreclosure sale,
Heritage was not able to sell the Parcel for over two years. In October 2000, Heritage
was finally able to sell the Parcel for $1,682,000, on terms favorable to the buyer.
(R1824 at 389:4-8; R1825 at 466:15-20.)
25.

Not even including the time and effort devoted to the marketing of the

Parcel by Heritage, the 2000 sales price of the Parcel was not appreciably higher than the
foreclosure sale price plus default interest and sales costs. (R1826 at 793:25-796:4.)
The Foreclosure Sale on the Remaining Four-Plex
26.

On July 14, 1998, Heritage sent a notice of foreclosure sale for the

remaining four-plex. (R1823 at 127:11-16; Notice of Trustee Sale dated 7/14/98,
Plaintiffs Exhibit 112.)
27.

Five F sought to enjoin that foreclosure sale by filing this action. Its

motion for preliminary injunction was denied by the trial court. (R68-69.) Five F then
filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay with the Utah Supreme Court, which was
denied. See Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, No. 981461 (August 12, 1998),
(R56-57).

THE JUDGE: . . . Assuming that your version of the facts is absolutely true in this case,
and setting aside the question of what's fair, was there anything here done that was not
permissible under the foreclosure statutes or the agreement of the parties?
MR. HATHAWAY [for Five F]: No.
(R1826 at 842:21-843:1.)
12

28.

Following the decisions of the trial and supreme courts in this case, the

foreclosure sale on the four-plex took place on August 12, 1998. At that foreclosure sale,
Heritage credit bit $210,000. (R1823 at 128:16-24.) As the high (and only) bidder at the
foreclosure sale, Heritage acquired title to the four-plex. (R1824 at 369:13-16; R1825 at
460:2-13.)
29.

Citing only to the Pretrial Order, Five F asserts in its Statement of Facts

that "Heritage had a buyer for the four-plex lined up prior to August 12, 1998, for a
purchase price of $280,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R1538)." (App. Br. at
17 TJ 25.) Although it is irrelevant, that statement is, in any event, absolutely false. The
Amended Proposed Pretrial Order contains no such statement nor is there evidence
anywhere else in the record to support such an assertion.14
30.

Although the amount of the loan was not fully extinguished by the two

foreclosure sales, Heritage never pursued a deficiency action against Five F or against
Fowler and his wife, the guarantors of the Note. (R1824 at 262:13-19; R1825 at 461:714.)
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After Heritage acquired the four-plex, Mr. Chadaz talked with the property manager
about the possibility of managing the four-plex for Heritage. The manager then asked
whether Heritage was interested in selling the four-plex, and Mr. Chadaz indicated that
Heritage might be interested. The property manager did, in fact, bring a party forward,
and Heritage sold the four-plex to that party on August 31, 1998, for $280,000 on
favorable contract terms. (R1824 at 372:7-25; R1825 at 461:23-463:2.)
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The fundamental issue in this case is whether a trustee or beneficiary under a trust
deed has a duty to bid (or otherwise credit) the fair market value of property at a
foreclosure sale where other collateral exists that may be subsequently foreclosed to
satisfy the debt.15 It is undisputed that no such duty is imposed by the Utah Trust Deed
Statute, Utah case law, or the Note and Trust Deed in this case. Five F cites no contrary
authority from Utah or any other jurisdiction to support its novel theory. Rather, Five F
attempts to manufacture this new and unprecedented duty under four different theories,
each of which fails as a matter of law.
In fact, Five F seeks to overturn the long-standing process of nonjudicial
foreclosures in Utah. Public policy, as incorporated in the Utah Trust Deed Statute,
permits lenders to credit bid at foreclosure sales whatever amount they deem prudent to
protect their interests after default. Thus, Five F seeks to amend the Trust Deed Statute to
impose a fair market value bidding requirement in foreclosure sales where the legislature
has determined not to impose one. Five F's position would be an unprecedented shift in

5

Five F does not clearly articulate what, in its view, Heritage did wrong in connection
with the foreclosure sales. In several places, Five F describes Heritage's bid as less than
the fair market value or "too low," (App. Br. at 7, 29), implying that Heritage should
have made a fair market value bid. In other places, Five F asserts that Heritage bid for
and acquired the Parcel at a price which it allegedly knew was less than the appraised
value, {id. at 7), implying that Heritage should have bid the alleged appraised value. In
still other places, Five F describes Heritage simply as having foreclosed on the Parcel
which had a value it knew was in excess of the outstanding debt, {id. at 21, 23, 25),
implying that whatever Heritage chose to bid, it should have not been able to proceed
with foreclosure of the four-plex. Both for analytical simplicity and for practical
reasons discussed elsewhere, Heritage describes Five F's position as an argument that
Heritage had a duty to bid the fair market value.
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the law with far-reaching adverse impact on the lending market. Moreover, although it
nowhere acknowledges it, Five F s argument effectively would transform the nonjudicial
foreclosure process into a judicial foreclosure process. Such an approach would shift to
lenders new risks and impose additional costs, inevitably impacting the efficiencies of the
foreclosure process and increasing costs for both borrowers and lenders in the mortgage
market.
ARGUMENT
L

THE LAW IMPOSES NO DUTY ON A TRUST DEED BENEFICIARY TO
BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PARCEL AT THE
FORECLOSURE SALE.
A.

The Operation Of Utah's Trust Deed Statute Provides A Well-Defmed
Procedure For Foreclosure, Which Heritage Followed.

A trust deed is a document by which a borrower pledges real property to a lender
as security for a loan. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3); (R1825 at 674:8-11.) Under Utah's
Trust Deed Statute there are three parties to a trust deed: a trustor/borrower (in this case,
Five F), a trustee who handles the foreclosure sale in case of a default (in this case,
Heritage), and a beneficiary/lender (Heritage). Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-19(l)-(6); (R1825
at 674:14-21.) In Utah, under specified circumstances, the same party can be both the
beneficiary and trustee.16 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2) (R1825 at 675:17-676:1.)
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There are only certain parties that can fill this dual role. See Utah Code Ann. §57-121(2).
15

The Trust Deed Statute creates a mechanism for foreclosing on property without
the involvement of the courts as an efficient mechanism for lenders to satisfy a defaulted
obligation through recourse to the collateral.
In the event a borrower fails to repay and defaults on a loan, the beneficiary can
send a notice of default, followed by a notice of a foreclosure sale on the real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23; (R1825 at 675:6-16.) On the date and at the time
and place designated in the notice of sale, the trustee is required to sell the property "at
public auction to the highest bidder." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27. The foreclosure sale is
"a way of turning land into cash . . . to satisfy the debt." (R1825 at 679:18-23.)
"Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale." Utah Code
Ann. § 53-1-27. There is no minimum amount anyone, including the beneficiary, must
bid. (R1825 at 684:19-685:2.)

A beneficiary may "credit bid" whereby the beneficiary

simply bids a credit toward the debt rather than bidding with cash. (Rl 825 at 683:18684:7.) A trustor borrower may also bid at the sale, and indeed the philosophy of the
Trust Deed Statute is that if the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the debt the
trustor/borrower will protect that "equity" by bidding itself.
Under Section 57-1-27, the trustee must sell the property to the highest bidder.
The only time that a trustee should reject the highest bid is when the bid is so low that it
"shocks the conscience" or reaches "unjust extremes." See Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d
186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (the remedy of setting aside a foreclosure sale is
appropriate only in cases which reach unjust extremes); Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670,
672 (10th Cir. 1962) ("In this jurisdiction, it is well settled that a judicial sale regularly
16

made with notice and in the manner prescribed by law will not be denied confirmation
or be set aside for mere inadequacy in price unless the price is so grossly inadequate as to
shock the conscience of the court and is coupled with slight additional circumstances
indicating unfairness such as chilled bidding.").
Upon conclusion of the foreclosure sale, title passes to the successful bidder. Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2). "The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first,
to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale .. . second, to
the payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the
person or persons legally entitled to the proceeds . . . . " Id. § 57-1-29.
If the debt is not fully satisfied, the trustee may proceed to notice up additional
collateral for foreclosure sale. Pursuant to Utah's "one action rule," Id. § 78-37-1. and
related case law, no collection lawsuit can be filed aeainst a borrower under Section 571-32 until all real property collateral has been foreclosed. At that point, if the obligation
is not fully satisfied, a lender may file a deficiency action under Section 57-1-32.
B.

Utah's Trust Deed Statute Does Not Impose Any Duty On A
Beneficiary To Bid Fair Market Value At A Foreclosure Sale.

Utah's Trust Deed Statute sets out the rights and duties of the respective parties to
a trust deed. It does not impose any duty on a beneficiary (let alone a trustee) to bid fair
market value at a foreclosure sale, or even to bid at all. See, e.g., First State Bank v.
Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] mortgagee is under no duty to
take affirmative action beyond that required by statute or the deed of trust to ensure a
'fair' sale

'"). The Utah Trust Deed Statute merely states:
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(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the trustee or
the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction to the highest
bidder. .. . Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the permissive language that a
beneficiary may bid necessarily means that there is no obligation that it must bid.
Because a creditor-beneficiary has no duty to bid under the statute, it follows that it could
have no duty to bid the fair market value of property subject to a foreclosure sale.
The absence of any such duty on a beneficiary is confirmed by two other parts of
the Trust Deed Statute. Section 57-1-27 provides that the trustee "shall sell the property
at public auction to the highest bidder." Using the instant case as a hypothetical, if a third
party instead of Heritage had bid $1,090,000 for the Parcel, Heritage, acting as trustee,
would have been obligated by statute to accept that bid, would have credited that amount
against the Note and proceeded with the second foreclosure sale on the four-plex. In that
common circumstance, Five F would find itself in exactly the same place with no
conceivable complaint against anyone. (R1825 at 467:15-21.) Nevertheless, under Five
F's theory, Heritage presumably would have a duty to put in a higher bid—a view
directly at odds with Section 57-1-27. The fact that it was Heritage rather than a third
party that bid the $1,090,000 thus makes no legal difference, demonstrating the flaw in
Five F's argument.
In addition, the defense found in Section 57-1-32 regarding the fair market value
of foreclosed property is clearly limited to only one setting. Section 57-1-32 provides
that the "court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold," if

18

and when a subsequent deficiency action is filed.

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32.

Under rules of statutory construction, the inclusion of such a fair market value in the
deficiency action setting necessarily implies that no such treatment occurs in other
aspects of the Trust Deed Statute, including the foreclosure setting of Section 57-1-27.
See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,1j 14, 993 P.2d 875 ("statutory
construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of
another"); Sorenson's Ranch Sch. v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354,111, 36 P.3d 528 (same).
Moreover, in addition to the fact that the Utah statute is clear, Five F cites no case
law or other authority to support its theory that Heritage was required to bid fair market
value at the foreclosure sale. Because Five F is arguing for a new, unprecedented legal
rule, its unsupported argument should be rejected.
Finally, Heritage's approach was consistent with existing practice in Utah. At
1R

trial, Heritage's foreclosure expert, Professor David Thomas,
Q.

testified:

...

Now, under those circumstances when Heritage came to credit bid at the, at
the July 13 sale, in your opinion was there anything improper about Heritage
coming in and entering a credit bid in the amount of $1,090,000?
A.

No.

17

Section 57-1-32 allows the borrower to protect its equity before a deficiency judgment
against the Borrower is entered.

18

Professor Thomas' expert testimony comports with his definitive treatise on Utah
property law, co-authored with James Backman. See David A. Thomas and James H.
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law 773-74, 782-85 (1999).
19

(R1825at685:3-686:4.)19
Finally, there is a practicality in the legislature's creation of an efficient
nonjudicial foreclosure process, which Five F's theories would upset. Under Five F's
view, Heritage had a duty to bid the appraised value or fair market value of the parcel (or
credit one of those amounts against the Note irrespective of its bid). But this view simply
does not work in a nonjudicial foreclosure setting. If Five F's theory is that Heritage
should have bid (or recognized) the "appraised" value, there is the problem of
determining how to set the appraised value where there are multiple appraisals (as is
common and is the case here) or where the creditor and debtor have conflicting
appraisals. Those problems would inevitably lead to litigation over the "appraised" value
before a creditor could proceed with other foreclosures. If, on the other hand, Five F's
view is that Heritage should have bid the alleged "fair market value" (or credited that
value against the Note), there is the similar problem of ascertaining the fair market value
- a problem necessarily leading to litigation before a further foreclosure action could
proceed on other collateral. Thus, Five F's theory surely would convert the statutorily
prescribed nonjudicial foreclosure process into a judicial litigation process.

A trustee typically will refuse to sell to a high bidder only if the bid "is so low that it
shocks the conscience." (R1825 at 682:16-25.) Professor Thomas testified that
Heritage's bid was not so low that it would "shock the conscience." (R1825 at 683:26.)
20

II.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ANY OF FIVE F'S
UNPRECEDENTED THEORIES THAT HERITAGE HAD A DUTY TO
BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE AT THE FORECLOSURE SALE.
Faced with the clear and longstanding law that a trust deed beneficiary is free to

bid at the foreclosure sale, if it chooses to bid at all, whatever it determines will protect
its interest, Five F advances four unprecedented theories in an attempt to create a new
duty to bid fair market value. Each of these theories fails as a matter of law.
A.

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of Its Status
As Trustee.

Five F's first theory is that Heritage had a duty to bid fair market value because, as
the trustee under the Trust Deed, it had a fiduciary duty to Five F to act in Five F's
interest, and that acting in Five F's interest meant bidding fair market value at the sale.
(See App. Br. at 7.) This theory is incorrect as a matter of law for two reasons. First,
under Utah law, a trust deed trustee-trustor relationship, standing alone, does not create a
fiduciary duty and Five F presented no evidence to establish any of the elements under
First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989)
("Banberry") that would create such a duty. Second, even if Heritage, as trustee, had a
fiduciary duty to Five F, it does not impose on a trustee a duty to accept only a fair
market value bid or, when the trustee is also the beneficiary, even to make such a bid.
1.

The Trustee-Trustor Relationship, Standing Alone, Does Not
Create A Fiduciary Duty.

Under Utah law the trust deed trustee-trustor relationship, standing alone, does not
create a fiduciary duty. Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, "the existence of a
duty between the trustee and trustor may be implied by the factual situation of a
21

particular case." Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256. In other words, there is no duty unless the
plaintiff can show that certain factual predicates exist. The Court in Banberry held that a
fiduciary duty between a trust deed trustee and a trustor arises only if one of the
following three elements is established:
(a)

the trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and relies on the
trustee's guidance; or

(b)

the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor; or

(c)

the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor.

Id.
a.

Five F Presented No Evidence At Trial To Meet The
Banberry Criteria For A Fiduciary Relationship.

The undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that Five F could show none of the
Banberry factors. As to Banberry'*s first factor, Five F presented no evidence that it
reposed trust or confidence in Heritage or relied on Heritage's guidance. Fowler testified
that Five F approached Heritage for the loan and did not rely on any advice from Heritage
about the River Road Project. (Rl 824 at 200:21-23.) Further, Fowler admitted that
Heritage had no input regarding Five F's business plan.

(Rl824 at 200:13-201:1.)

Indeed, Fowler acknowledged that Five F was "wholly independent from Heritage Bank
with respect to [the River Road Project]," (R1824 at 201:2-4), and that the transaction
was "arms-length." (R1824 at 202:5-10.) "When the parties deal 'at arm's length' or in

In its brief, Five F asserts that Fowler "shared confidential business plans and other
information with Heritage." (App. Br. at 19 \ llz.) But there is a critical difference
between disclosing plans to Heritage as part of a loan application process, as Five F did,
and seeking advice or guidance from Heritage on those plans, which Five F did not.
22

an adversarial relationship, no fiduciary relationship can be said to exist." Gold
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996). Thus, the evidence
shows that Five F placed no relevant trust or confidence in Heritage, nor did it rely on
Heritage's guidance.
With respect to Banberry's second factor, Five F presented no evidence that
Heritage exercised extraordinary influence over it. Indeed, Fowler admitted that there
was no such influence:
Q.

And at anytime in those discussions, (short inaudible, audio faded)
you were free to terminate negotiations and go somewhere else?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Fleritage had no influence or control over you in that respect?

A.

That's correct.

(R1824 at 202:11-17.) This testimony precludes any claim of "extraordinary
influence" within the meaning of Banberry's second factor.
Finally, there was no evidence at trial supporting Banberry's third factor,
i.e., that Heritage was in a dominant position over Five F. A lender/borrower
relationship, without more, does not constitute a dominant relation. See First
Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Development Corporation, 786 P.2d
1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) (noting that " 'relation of mortgagor and mortgagee is not
of a fiduciary character.'") {quoting Willett v. HerricK 155 N.E. 589, 595 (Mass.
1927). At the time Five F approached Heritage for the loan, Five F had no other
outstanding loans with Heritage. (R1824 at 201:13-24.) Therefore, Heritage was
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not in any position to influence Five F's decisions. By Five F's own testimony,
the process of obtaining the loan was a "business negotiation" which Five F was
free to terminate at any time. (R1824 at 202:1-14.) Thus, Five F presents no
evidence to show Heritage was in a position to "dominate" Five F.
Given Five F's evidentiary failure, none of the Banberry factors are met and
Heritage, as a trust deed trustee, had no fiduciary duty to Five F.
b.

Five F's Reliance On Blodgett Is Misplaced.

Five F nevertheless asserts that Heritage owed Five F a fiduciary duty as trustee,
without regard to the existence of any of the three Banberry factors. (App. Br. at 24-25.)
In its argument on this point, Five F ignores the controlling authority of Banberry and
relies instead on outdated and very general language in Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d
298, 302 (Utah 1970), which states: "[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater
than the mere obligation to sell pledged property in accordance with the default
provisions of the trust deed instrument, it is to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance
with a high punctilio of honor." (App. Br. at 25 {citing Blodgett 590 P.2d at 302).) Five
F points to this language as the basis for its claim that Heritage as trustee owed it a
fiduciary duty. However, Five F's reliance on Blodgett is misplaced for two reasons.
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In its brief, Five F argues that "[g]iven the well-known 'golden rule' ('thems that got
the gold makes the rules'), Heritage could and did demand from Five F almost anything
that Heritage desired and Five F had to knuckle under or not get the loan." (App. Br. at
19 T{ 32b.) The standard lender-borrower relationship, which Five F tries to describe
colorfully, does not create the kind of "extraordinary influence" or "domination"
contemplated in Banberry.
24

First, Banberry clarified the very language in Blodgett on which Five F now
relies. Citing Blodgett, the Banberry Court explained:
And in cases [a] where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and
relies on the trustee's guidance or [b] where the trustee could exercise
extraordinary influence over the trustor or [c] where the trustee stands in a
dominant position to the trustor, it is possible that the trustee is bound by a
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor.
Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). Thus, Banberry directly rejects Five F's
argument that a trust deed trustee has a fiduciary duty to a trustor irrespective of the
requisite showing that one of the three Banberry elements exists. Second, even if
considered without Banberry's clarification, Blodgett 's general fiduciary language
contains no suggestion that a trustee (or beneficiary) has any duty to bid any amount at a
foreclosure sale or that a trustee has duties different than those set forth in the statute.
2.

Even If Heritage, As Trustee, Had A Fiduciary Duty, That Duty
Did Not Require Heritage To Bid Fair Market Value At The
Foreclosure Sale.

Even if Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, as a matter of law it
did not breach that duty. Heritage acted in strict accord with Utah law as well as with the
terms of the Trust Deed. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 925 ("a trustee fulfills his duty to act
with impartiality and fairness by strictly complying with the terms of the deed of trust")As trustee, Heritage's express duties were to notice the default and sale and to conduct

1

The trial court apparently found that Heritage had a fiduciary duty, as trustee, to Five F
although the trial court made no finding on whether Five F had made any evidentiary
showing as to the three factors. (Rl 826 at 849:2-8; 850:2-9.) Although the trial court
reached the correct result, i.e., Heritage acted in compliance with the Trust Deed Statute
and Trust Deed and therefore had no liability to Five F. the trial court incorrectlv ruled
that Heritage had a fiduciary duty.
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the sale in accordance with the statute and Trust Deed, which it did. Under both
Paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed and Section 57-1-27 of the Trust Deed Statute, the
Trustee was required to accept Heritage's bid because it was the highest bid submitted.
Frontier Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Douglass, 853 P.2d 553, 558 (Ida. 1993) (finding
that trustee was required to accept bid of only bidder at sale, even though bidder was also
mortgagee). Indeed, if Heritage as trustee had rejected Heritage's credit bid, it would
have breached its statutory duty as trustee.23 Five F does not assert that Heritage, as
trustee, should or could have rejected the one and only bid it received on the Parcel.

While it is unclear exactly what conduct Five F alleges constituted a breach of
Heritage's duty as trustee, Five F presumably contends that the breach occurred when
Heritage (as trustee) failed to reject the credit bid submitted by Heritage (as beneficiary).
(App. Br. at 7.) Such a theory is directly rejected by case law in Utah and other
jurisdictions. As discussed above, the only time that a trustee may reject the highest bid
is when that bid is so low that it "shocks the conscience" or reaches "unjust extremes."
See Thomas, 801 P.2d at 188 (the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate
only in cases which reach unjust extremes). Given the degree of public notice Heritage
gave to the foreclosure auction, Heritage's bid for the parcel reflects a fair market value.
Moreover, Heritage's bid clearly did not come close to the legal test that it
"shock[] the conscience" or reach an "unjust extreme." In fact, Heritage's bid was well
within range. And, Professor Thomas testified that Heritage's bid was not so low that it
"shock[ed] the conscience." Indeed was not remotely close to that level. (R1825 at
682:16-683:2-6.) The amount that Heritage bid translates to $104,406 per acre, which is
a greater amount per acre than Five F paid when it purchased the property in 1996, i.e.,
$102,173.91 per acre. (R1823 at 194:1-5.) See CrosslandMortgage Corp. v. Frankel,
596 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (App. Dev. 2nd. Dept. 1993) (bid of $55,000, representing 27%34% of property's approximate market value of $160,000 to $200,000, did not shock
conscience); Benavides v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. Bank, 433 S.E.2d 528, 531 (W. Va.
1993) (bid of $65,000, representing 48% of alleged value of $136,500, did not shock
conscience); Myles v. Cox, 217 So.2d 31, 33 (Miss. 1968) (bid of $3,218, which was
40%-50% of property's value of $6,500-$8,000, did not shock the conscience of the
court); Juhan, 311 F.2d at 673 (sale for 75% of appraised value was not "so grossly
inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.").
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Finally, even if Heritage as trustee had a duty to reject any bid that was not a fair
market value bid, Five F presented no expert testimony at trial as to the fair market value
of the Parcel as of the date of the foreclosure sale or that Heritage's bid was "shockingly"
low. That evidentiary failure also defeats Five F's claim.
B.

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value As A Result Of Its
Joint Status As A Trustee And Beneficiary,

Five F next argues that Heritage's joint status as both trustee and beneficiary under
the trust deed imposed on Heritage a heightened duty. (App. Br. at 21.) Five F asserts
that "[e]ven if you assume that under the parties' agreements and foreclosure law,
Heritage would in the absence of a fiduciary duty have been able to bid low and then
proceed to foreclose on the other parcels of collateral owned by Five F - everything
changed when Heritage voluntarily assumed the dual role of trustee." {Id. at 25-26.) Not
surprisingly, Five F cites no law for this novel proposition.
Utah law expressly permits a financial institution such as Heritage to function as
both trustee and beneficiary under a trust deed without imposing any additional duties
relating thereto. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2). Thus, Five F's theory of an enhanced
fiduciary duty for filling both roles cannot be sustained.
C

Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of The
Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.

Five F's third theory is that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
imposed on Heritage a duty to bid the fair market value at the foreclosure sale. (App. Br.
at 27-28.) Five F argues that "[j]ust because on the face of the documents a party 'can'
do something, does not mean that the party 'should' do that something." {Id. at 22-23.)
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In this case, Five F agreed to the terms of the Trust Deed that, consistent with
Utah's Trust Deed Statute, specifically authorized Heritage to proceed with a foreclosure
sale upon default and provided that the Parcel would be sold "at public auction to the
highest bidder." (See Trust Deed TI 15.) Despite this, under a theory of good faith and
fair dealing, Five F argues that Heritage as trustee should have acted contrary to the Trust
Deed and not sold the Parcel to the highest bidder or, as the beneficiary, should have bid
a theoretical fair market value itself. There is no legal support for either position.
1.

Heritage Did Not Have An Obligation To Exercise An Express
Contract Right To Its Detriment.

Five F contends that Heritage breached the implied covenant by "seeking to take
additional collateral when the debt had already been paid."24 (App. Br. at 22-23.)
However, the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not require a party who has
received an express contract right to exercise that right to its own detriment for the
purpose of benefiting the other party. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah
1991) ("Nor can a covenant of good faith be used . . . to require a party vested with a
contract right to exercise that right in a manner contrary to that party's legitimate selfinterest.")

Five F clearly misstates or misunderstands the trust deed statute. By operation of law,
Five F's debt was not paid by the first foreclosure sale. The "proceeds" of the sale, i.e.,
the credit bid, by statute applied first to the costs and expenses of the foreclosure and
then to the "payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed." Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-29. Thus, since the amount of the high bid was less than the outstanding
obligation, the debt was not paid.
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Under Utah statutory law and the Trust Deed, Heritage had no duty to bid at all,
let alone to bid the fair market value of the Parcel. Bidding a number higher than it did
would have been to Heritage's detriment because the value of the raw land was uncertain,
the property had not been sold over the prior two years, and Heritage would bear the risk
of any decrease in the property's value.25 (See R1825 at 450:11-23, 451:24-452:15;
R1826 at 720:7-15, 721:25-722:1, 725:10-16, 733:3-734:4, 743:6-9, 750:15-20, 760:23761:1,761:21-25.)
Heritage had the express contractual right, under both the Trust Deed and the
bankruptcy Plan, to foreclose on the additional collateral of the four-plex if the actual
proceeds from the sale of the Parcel did not satisfy the debt. Under Brehany, Heritage
was not required to take an unknown and uncertain risk and forfeit its contractual right to
foreclose on the four-plex simply because it would have benefited Five F.
2.

Five F Could Have No Reasonable Expectation That Heritage
Would Bid The Fair Market Value Of The Parcel.

Five F argues that it "almost certainly would have a reasonable expectation that
only enough of its collateral to actually satisfy the debt would be foreclosed upon by
Heritage." (App. Br. at 27.) The only factual support presented by Five F for that
argument relative to its expectations under the Note and Trust Deed is the assertion that
"[njeither Five F nor Ray Fowler bid at the sale because they believed that the
foreclosure by Heritage on the 10.44 acre [Parcel] would and did satisfy the entire debt to

If the value of the Parcel decreased after the auction, Heritage would have no recourse
to the borrower or guarantors after three months. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32.
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Heritage.'

(App. Br. at 17 f 21.) But Five F cites no separate record evidence for that

assertion.
Five F's position on this point is both legally wrong and illogical. First, Five F
could have no reasonable expectation contrary to Utah law. It necessarily expected that
the Parcel would be sold to highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, whether or not that high
bidder was Heritage and whether or not Five F agreed with the bid. As discussed above,
the hypothetical of a third party successfully bidding $1,090,000 disposes of Five F's
argument. Thus, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that the proceeds of the
foreclosure auction on the Parcel would satisfy its debt.
Second, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that Heritage would bid at all
at the foreclosure sale. See Boatmen's Bank of Pulaski Co. v. Wilson, 833 S.W.2d 879,
882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting mortgagee was under no obligation to bid at all).
Neither the Note, the Trust Deed, nor the Trust Deed Statute impose any obligation on
the beneficiary to bid, let alone to bid Five F's expected value of the Parcel at a
foreclosure sale.

This assertion is unsupportable because Five F had tried unsuccessfully to develop or
sell the Parcel for over two years and made no showing at trial that it had the resources
to buy the Parcel if it had bid. In addition, Fowler testified at trial:
Q.

A.

Did you ever communicate to the bank before you signed this, say to the bank
before you loan me the $1.2-million I'm asking you for I just want to be clear that
even though the trust deed doesn't say it I expect you to bid fair market value if I
default. Did you ever say anything like that to the bank?
No.

(R1824 at 275:23-276:4.)
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Moreover, case law from other jurisdictions is to the contrary. See, e.g., New
England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 630 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Conn. 1993) ("We can find no
basis, however, in our state law or understandings regarding foreclosure by sale for the
proposition that a debtor is legally entitled to a credit for the fair market value of the
property sold. A debtor's legal entitlement is, instead, to a credit for the amount of the
sale proceeds.55); Olbres v. Hampton Cooperative Bank, 698 A.2d 1239, 1243 (N.H.
1997) (mortgagee did not act negligently or in bad faith and did not lack due diligence by
bidding $135,000 where pre-loan appraisals set value equal to or exceeding $330,000).27
See also Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, 11 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2000) ("[e]ven if
the foreclosure sale price was less than what the fair market value of the property would
have been under ordinary marketing conditions, that fact, without more, did not result in
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing/5).
The reason for this rule is self-evident. There is risk associated with owning
property, especially raw land. Its value may rise or fall. It may be difficult to sell, as
proved to be the case here, forcing the successful bidder to hold it longer than desired.
Under Utah law, the high bidder at a foreclosure sale takes title to the property and
therefore assumes the entire risk therefor. Moreover, it is undisputed that an appraisal is
not a guarantee of the present fair market value of property, let alone what the property
will be worth in the future.28 (R1824 at 442:4-14.) As a result, property can and often

27

Professor Thomas testified that in Utah there was no minimum amount that Heritage
was required to bid. (R1825 at 684:24-685:2.)

28

Professor Thomas explained why a lender would bid less than existing appraisals:
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does sell for less than its appraised value. {Id) Moreover, appraisals of raw land, as
here, do not "have the same level of certitude that you might expect in the home
mortgage market/' (R1826 at 715:5-9.) According to Mr. Beesley, Heritage's CEO,
"every lender that makes a loan will likely have an appraisal in the file that is for a
substantial amount greater than the loan." Mr. Beesley went on to explain that "if the
appraisals could be relied on with certainty there would never be a bad loan, there would
always be a margin. But... when a loan goes into default it's been my experience that
the appraisals tend to .. . show their weakness. Because the loan wouldn't go into default
if the borrower were able to sell it for .. . its appraised value or something near its
appraised value." (R1826 at 715:16-716:4.)
Thus, as a practical matter, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that
Heritage would bid fair market appraisal value for the Parcel. At the time of the first
foreclosure sale, there was particular uncertainty regarding the value of the Parcel
because it was raw commercial ground. Indeed, Five F's own economic damages expert,

Q.
Can you tell me based on the experience that you've had in the foreclosure
process why a lender would come to a foreclosure sale and enter a credit bid that
was less than the amount of the appraisals that had been received?
A.
In my opinion it's because the lender is a .. . concerned about whether the
actual fair market value of the property is going to be anywhere near that credit
bid. The lender has the entire risk . .. that it will not be. And . . . particularly in
view of the fact that no other bidders have come forward in the auction, that's a
significant risk.
(R1825 at 685:3-686:4.)
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Derk Rasmussen, acknowledged the Parcel could decrease in value in the future.
(R1825 at 584:13-19.) As striking proof of this reality, Fowler, Five F's president,
acknowledged the uncertain value and "difficulty" in trying to sell the Parcel:
Q.

Would it be fair to say that it was your personal decision not to try to sell
the Parcel before the foreclosure sale?

A.

It was a rather impractical decision. // would have been impractical to try
to sell a narrow piece of land a, that a, was part of a bigger picture.

Q.

And you put Heritage in the position of having itself to try to sell what you
just admitted was a difficult piece of property to sell. Correct?

A.

Yes.

(RI826 at 830:1 i-S31:3 (emphasis added).)
Most compelling is Rasmussen's admission that he had previously advised a
financial institution to credit bid less than the lowest appraised value in the financial
institution's files, which is exactly what Heritage did in this case. (R1825 at 585:8-16.)
Where Five F's own expert has previously advised a financial institution to do exactly
what Heritage did with respect to the Parcel in this case, Five F cannot seriously contend
that Heritage should have taken a risk that was detrimental to its own interests.
These factors and circumstances demonstrate why Five F could have no
reasonable expectation as to what, if anything, Heritage might bid for the Parcel.

Rasmussen further testified that the Parcel "had risk associated with it and it had no
income," (R1825 at 588:5-8), and acknowledged that Heritage would have borne the
risk that the Parcel might go down in value or not sell at all. (R1825 at 584:13-19.)
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a.

Heritage Did Not Have A Duty To Bid The Full Amount
Of The Debt Or Otherwise Extinguish It.

Five F also suggests that Heritage had a good faith obligation to treat Five F's debt
as having been extinguished because the Parcel allegedly was worth more than the
amount of the debt. (App. Br. at 9.) That argument is also contrary to law. See First
Comm. Mortgage v. Reece, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 23, 27 n.l (Cal. Ct. App. Div. 3 2001) ("The
lender 'is not required to open the bidding with a full credit bid, but may bid whatever
amount [it] thinks the property is worth."') (quoting Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance
Co, v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425, 432 (1989)); Virginia Housing DevpAuth. v.
Fox Run Ltd. Partnership, 497 S.E.2d 747, 752 (Va. 1998)) ("VHDA was under no
obligation to bid the full amount of the debt at the foreclosure sale, especially if, in its
estimation, the debtor had assets that could satisfy any deficit remaining after the sale.").
As one Court noted, u[w]hen, as was the fact here, 'a mortgagee . . . is both seller and
buyer, his position is one of great delicacy. Yet, when he has done his full duty to the
mortgagor in his conduct of the sale under the power, and the bidding begins, in his
capacity as bidder a mortgagee may buy as cheaply as he can, and owes no duty to bid
the full value of the Property as that value may subsequently be determined by a judge or
a jury." WestRoxbury Co-Op Bank v. Bowser, 87 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. 1949).
D.

The Foreclosure Process Followed By Heritage Is Not The Legal
Equivalent Of A Deficiency Judgment.

Finally, Five F argues that the "policy" of the "deficiency judgment statute (§571-32) should be applied to the present situation." (App. Br. at 29.) Five F cites no
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authority for this proposition, and it offers no other basis to substitute its view of public
policy for that of the Utah Legislature.
1.

Five F Is Barred From Raising This Issue On Appeal Because It
Did Not Raise This Issue At Trial.

Heritage was entitled by Utah statute to foreclose seriatim on the additional
collateral without implicating the deficiency judgment statute. Indeed, the deficiency
judgment statute is implicated only when the creditor files an action seeking a deficiency
judgment. See § 57-1-32. Nevertheless, Five F argues that Heritage's foreclosure on any
collateral other than the Parcel was the equivalent of seeking a deficiency judgment and
that, as a result, Heritage should not have been permitted to foreclose on any collateral
other than the Parcel. (App. Br. at 7.) However, Five F did not raise this issue at trial,30

In its brief, Five F states that the issue of whether foreclosing on the four-plex was the
equivalent of seeking a deficiency judgment was "[preserved for appeal," listing a
number of record citations, copies of which are contained in the Addendum at Tab J.
(App. Br. at 3.) A search of the citations referenced shows no such preservation.
Contrary to this assertion, Five F never raised this issue at trial. Indeed, Five F's citations
to the trial testimony do not even remotely reference the concept of a deficiency
judgment. With respect to the trial record, Five F cites "Plaintiffs Opening Argument
R.1823 at 28." {Id.) However, that page consists solely of the first several lines of Five
F's opening statement in which Five F's counsel thanked the jury for its service.
Likewise, the other citations to the trial record do not reference a deficiency argument.
See R1825 at 621 (discussion of fiduciary duty and Blodgett v. Marsh), R1825 at 636
(discussion of good faith and fair dealing) and R1825 at 642 (discussion of late fee
charges) and R1826 at 836 (discussion of judicial estoppel). Moreover, Five F's citation
to its Trial Memorandum at R1522-1530 is improper because it does not even mention
the deficiency argument. Five F's citation to the Proposed Pretrial Order at R1701-1735
discusses a "deficiency judgment," but in a different context than it now argues on
appeal. In the Pretrial Order, Five F states that Heritage "pursu[ed] the deficiency
judgment to the extent of rents collected during Five F's bankruptcy." (R1467)
(emphasis added), not that foreclosure ot the four-plex was a deficiency. The Pretrial
Order simply does not preserve the deficiency argument that Five F now advances on
appeal.
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and it is therefore now precluded from raising it on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (as a general rule, party who fails to bring issue
before trial court is barred from asserting issue initially on appeal); accord Jones v.
Loosle, 2001 WL 311195 *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Even if Five F's "deficiency" argument were properly before this Court (which it
is not), it fails for two additional reasons. First, Utah law specifically defines a
deficiency action, and foreclosing on additional collateral is not such an action. See Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Second, a deficiency judgment is a personal liability; it does not
extend to foreclosure against other collateral.

The remaining citations are to filings that were not introduced at trial, but rather
were ruled on or submitted long before trial. In two filings, Five F made only general
references to a deficiency, but did not sufficiently argue the issue it now attempts to
appeal. In Five F's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Rl-44), Five F referenced
an attempt "to obtain a deficiency" (R20-21.) However, that motion was denied (R6869), and Five F has not appealed that denial here. In Five F's Memorandum in
Opposition to Heritage's Motion for Summary Judgment, Five F discusses "a deficiency
for the cash rents collected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order." (R627 (emphasis
added)). However, as was the case in the Pretrial Order, Five F's deficiency argument
related only to Heritage's pursuit of additional collateral, the cash rents, as opposed to the
argument Five F advances on appeal, i.e., whether "bidding on the second trustee's sale
[involving the four-plex] . . . derogatfed] . . . Utah law with regard to deficiency
judgments." (App. Br. at 3.) Moreover, the pursuit of "cash rents" was originally part of
Heritage's counterclaim, which Heritage later voluntarily dismissed. (R1462-64.)
Finally, there is no reference to this argument at all in the plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R1038-1077.) Therefore, any argument
that pursuit of the "cash rents" was the pursuit of a deficiency is moot. Perhaps most
troubling is the fact that Five F uses this identical series of citations for six of its seven
issues, which reveals that this string of citations was simply inserted in the brief without
any analysis of whether the referenced portions of the record actually referenced any
particular issue.
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2.

Heritage's Foreclosure Of Its Collateral Is Not A Deficiency
Judgment Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 Because It Is Not An
"Action."

Deficiency judgments in Utah are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32.
Heritage's foreclosure of the four-plex was not an "action" within the meaning of Utah's
deficiency statute (§ 57-1-32) and, therefore, Five F's position must be rejected.
Five F attempts to bring the foreclosure sale on the four-plex within the purview of
this statute by arguing that Heritage's foreclosure against the second parcel of property
(the four-plex) was a "defacto deficiency judgment against Five F." (App. Br. at 29.)
However, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected this very argument.
In Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court considered whether a creditor who had already foreclosed on one parcel
of real property could liquidate a second item of collateral (the proceeds of a note and
mortgage assigned by the debtor) which was pledged for the same debt, despite the fact
that the creditor had failed to file a deficiency action within the three month period
following the initial foreclosure sale. The Court concluded that the creditor's use of
additional collateral does not constitute an "action" within the meaning of § 57-1-32:
In this case, however, USCU did not seek a deficiency judgment
against Phillips, but merely sought to retain its additional security. USCU's
retention and use of this additional security was not legal action, but merely
a retention of its validly assigned security interest, and was not the type of
"action" against Phillips which is prohibited by section 57-1-32....
We therefore hold that where a creditor takes more than one item of
security upon an obligation secured by a trust deed, the creditor is not
precluded from making use of that additional security merely because the
creditor has not sought a deficiency judgment within three months of a
non-judicial sale of one of the items covered by the trust deed property, nor
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is the creditor required to seek a deficiency judgment under section 57-1-32 in
order to maintain its right to the additional security, so long as the security
is applied toward the debt owed on the original loan.
Id. at 178. Thus, the liquidation of additional collateral following a foreclosure sale is not
subject to §57-1-32, which is applicable only to a creditor's action to obtain a deficiency
judgment against the debtor.
The Phillips decision is consistent with well-settled law from other jurisdictions
holding that pursuit of additional collateral is not the same as seeking a deficiency
judgment. See, e.g., Hodges v. Mark, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
("[additional security in the form of property . . . or assignments or [sic] rents . . . can be
exhausted notwithstanding the antideficiency legislation."); Bank ofChenoa v. Bagby,
467 N.E.2d 596, 598 (111. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that "[ujntil all of the collateralincluding personalty and realty—has been disposed of, a deficiency does not exist" and
that bank's foreclosure on two mortgages that secured notes was not an attempt to obtain
deficiency judgment, but rather "was simply the act of a creditor exercising his remedies
against collateral for a note in default."); Hatch v. Security-First Nat'I Bank, 19 Cal.2d
254, 262 (1942) (fair value provisions of deficiency statute do not apply to multiplysecured creditor who realizes on additional security without attempting to secure money
judgment for unpaid balance).
The facts and legal arguments in Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, 11 P.3d
383 (Cal. 2000) {"Dreyfuss"), are strikingly similar to the present case. In Dreyfuss, the
borrowers took out a loan from a bank which was secured by a deed of trust and
guaranteed personally by the borrowers. Id. at 385. After the borrowers defaulted, the
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loan agreement was modified and two additional parcels of real property were pledged
as collateral. However, the borrowers again defaulted, and the bank initiated foreclosure
proceedings on all three parcels. Subsequently, the borrowers filed bankruptcy, resulting
in an automatic stay. Under a forbearance agreement, the debt was discounted if paid in
full by a date certain. However, the borrowers failed to make that payment, and therefore
the bank recommenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. At the time of the
foreclosure sale, the outstanding indebtedness exceeded $3.75 million, and the bank made
a $2.15 million credit bid on the first parcel of property. Because there was still
outstanding debt, the bank held a foreclosure sale on the second parcel of collateral, at
which it made another successful credit bid, leaving a $200,000 debt. Id. at 386. Finally,
the bank foreclosed on the third parcel of property, which extinguished the debt. Id.
Notably, the bank never sought a money judgment against the borrowers or guarantors
after foreclosure of the collateral. Id.
On appeal, the court addressed whether California's antideficiency provisions
"restrict the ability of a creditor to exhaust multiple items of collateral in a series of
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings." Id. The borrowers contended "that the policies
underlying the antideficiency provisions preclude a creditor from obtaining not only a
deficiency judgment, but what they characterize as the 'functional equivalent of a
deficiency judgment,'" contending, as Five F does here, that "application of the fair
market value provisions of [the deficiency statute] is required to avoid a windfall
recovery to the creditor/' Id. at 389. The borrowers further stated u[w]ithout such
protection, a borrower who secures a debt with items of multiple security runs the risk
39

that all of it will be sold to satisfy the obligation, even if the fair market value of one
item of security is sufficient to satisfy the debt."31 Id. at 389-90. Rejecting the
borrowers' argument, the court stated:
[W]e are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' proposal that we construe [the deficiency
statute] with reference to multiple security situations to permit a borrower who
believes the creditor did not credit the fair value of property recovered in prior
sales to set aside a subsequent trustee's sale or provide for restitution of an unjust
recovery. We also reject any similar suggestion that we construe the statute to
permit a debtor to go to court to challenge the price obtained at a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale and have subsequent sales enjoined if the sales to date have
satisfied the debt based on a fair market valuation.
Id. at 390. The Court also noted "there is a significant difference between selling
additional security that has been pledged for a loan and recovering a deficiency judgment
against the personal assets of the borrower." Id. at 391.
Under Phillips and other authority, Heritage was simply foreclosing on additional
collateral, and was not thereby obtaining a deficiency judgment against Five F.
3.

Heritage's Foreclosure Of Additional Collateral Was Not The
Pursuit Of A Deficiency Judgment Because Heritage Did Not
Seek A Personal Judgment Against An Individual.

In addition, Five F misapprehends the nature of a deficiency judgment. Section
57-1-32 clearly refers to a suit "to recover the balance due" on the Note against the

31

Regarding the borrowers' "windfall" argument, the court stated "[a]s to the potential of
a windfall recovery to the creditor, because . . . the creditor is entitled to bid for the
property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in an amount less than the total amount due
. . . there is always the theoretical possibility that the creditor could eventually sell the
real property collateral for an amount greater than its successful credit bid and the
amount of the outstanding debt. But that is true whether one or multiple items of real
property collateral are sold, and whether the sales are conducted at once or seriatim."
Dreyfuss, 11 P.3d at 390.
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borrower. A deficiency judgment is the "imposition of personal liability on [a]
mortgagor for [the] unpaid balance of [a] mortgage debt after foreclosure has failed to
yield [the] full amount of [the] due debt/' Black's Law Dictionary at 379 (emphasis
added). Thus, a deficiency judgment can result only when the lender seeks to impose
personal liability on an individual or entity. This principle is reinforced by case law. See
Hodges, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d at 703 (noting antideficiency statute "prohibits only a deficiency
judgment in the strict sense, i.e., & personal judgment against the debtor. It does not
prevent the creditor from realizing on additional security .. . .") (emphasis in original)
{quoting 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Secured Transactions in Real
Property § 162, at 661).
Here, Heritage simply did not seek a deficiency judgment, and further, Heritage
has never sought to impose & personal liability on Five F or the Fowlers for the amount
remaining after foreclosure, (R1824 at 262:13-19; R1825 at 461:7-14), which Five F
acknowledged. (R1825 at 570:5-7.) Heritage simply held successive foreclosures sales
of separate parcels of collateral, and such successive foreclosure sales are not deficiency
judgments. See Dreyfuss, 11 P.3d at 388 (stating "[u]nder settled decisional law, a
creditor's resort to any and all security on a debt does not implicate the antideficiency
provisions.'^). Five F's attempt to analogize a legitimate foreclosure into a deficiency
judgment must be rejected as a matter of law.
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IIL

FIVE F'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Five F contends that "[a] finder of fact could have very reasonably concluded

based upon the facts as adduced by Five F at trial that Heritage was unjustly enriched by
its excessive recovery." (App. Br. at 28.) However, the unjust enrichment claim could
not have been decided by the jury because Five F agreed in the Pretrial Order that "Five
F's claim of unjust enrichment. .. will be tried by the Court outside the presence of the
jury."32 (R1707.) Thus, Five F's unjust enrichment claim would not have been
submitted to the jury in any event. Therefore, Five F's argument that the trial court
should have submitted Five F's unjust enrichment to the jury contradicts its stipulation in
the Pretrial Order.
A.

Unjust Enrichment Is Not Available Where There Is A Contract
Claim,

Five F contends that "[w]hen the trial court ruled that Five F had no contractual or
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Heritage, it was improper for the court to refuse to
consider Five F's unjust enrichment alternative theory for relief." (App. Br. at 28.)
This argument is incorrect because the remedy of unjust enrichment is only
available where there is no legal remedy. See Lysenko v. Saw aya, 973 P.2d 445, 449 (Ct.
App. 1999) affd, 7 P.3d 783 (Utah 2000) (noting "the Utah Supreme Court has stated

Moreover, Five F stipulated in the Pretrial Order "that if its claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust
enrichment claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the
defense of judicial estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury."
(R1707.)
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that the unjust enrichment 'doctrine is designed to provide an equitable remedy [only]
where one does not exist at law. In other words, if a legal remedy is available . . . the law
will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment.5") {quoting American Towers
Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996))).
Five F misapprehends the nature of the trial court's ruling. The trial court did not
rule that Five F had no contractual basis for relief; rather, it ruled that Five F had failed to
satisfy the elements of its contractual claim. Therefore, the trial court's ruling was based
on Five F's failure of proof, not on Five F's absence of a contractual remedy. Because
Five F had a contractual basis for relief, the trial court correctly declined to submit the
unjust enrichment claim to the jury.
Moreover, there was no unjust enrichment in this case for three reasons. First,
Heritage was put at risk of not realizing fully on its loan by Five F's default. Second,
Five F knew from the very beginning that Heritage viewed the Parcel as insufficient
collateral for the loan. Third, Five F's position in this suit is itself fundamentally unfair.
In effect, Five F wants Heritage to bear all the risk in a default. In Five F's view, it
should be entitled to any upside with respect to post-foreclosure collateral, i.e., if
Heritage is able to sell the foreclosed property for more than the original debt, Five F
should get the benefit, but should have none of the downside risk, i.e., if Heritage had
been unable to sell the Parcel for what it bid, it could not then seek a deficiency judgment
against Five F or the guarantors.
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SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED
For the foregoing reasons, Heritage respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County.
Dated this 7uJ

day of April, 2003.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
/ B r e n t D.Wride
/ y Elaina M. Maragakis
and
JONES WALDOiibLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

.George W. Pratt

701395v2
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Addendum

A.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998)

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998)

C.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1998)

D.

Court's Ruling R 1826 at 846:14—852:25

E.

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict

F.

Final Judgment

G.

Amended Proposed Pretrial Order

H.

Plaintiffs Promissory Note

I.

Plaintiffs Trust Deed

J.

Matters cited by Five F as preserving issues for appeal

Tab A

Page 1
ation
ST S 57-1-21
C.A. 1953 § 57-1-21

Search Result

Rank 1 of 1

Database
UT-STANN98

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES
Copyright
1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
•1-21

Trustees of trust deeds --Qualifications.

1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance
ipany authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United
ites;

(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah under
\ laws of Utah or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business in
ih under the laws of Utah;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or
julated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor.
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing
.or to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement that is
)plemental to that trust deed.
[2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed,
.ess the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (1)(a)(ii),
_i) , (v) , or (vi) .
story: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch. 110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985,
. 64, § 1; 1996, ch. 182, § 25.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
\mendment Notes. --The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, added the
^section (1)(a) and (1)(b) designations, redesignating former Subsections
i(a) to (f) as (1)(a)(i) to (vi); substituted "depository institution as
fined in Section 7-1-103" for "bank, building and loan association, savings
i loan association" in Subsection (1) (a) (ii); and made related and stylistic
anges.
'Effective date of this chapter."—The phrase "effective date of this
apter," in Subsection (1)(b), first appeared in this section as amended by L.
35, ch. 64, § 1. That act (L. 1985, ch. 64) took effect on April 29, 1985.
Zross-References. — U t a h State Bar, § 78-51-1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
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Database
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES
Copyright
1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
1-27

Sale of trust property by public auction --Postponement of sale.

1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale,
i trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public
:tion to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may
Lduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in
.erest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust
>perty shall be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or
reels which can be sold to advantage separately. The trustee or attorney for
> trustee shall follow these directions. Any person, including the beneficiary
trustee, may bid at the sale. Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer,
I if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold
him at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell
i property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay the
i price is liable for any loss occasioned by the refusal, including interest,
sts, and trustee's and reasonable attorneys' fees. The trustee or the attorney
: the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of that person.
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedient,
stpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. If the last hour of the
stponement falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale may be
stponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday,
a legal holiday. The person conducting the sale shall give notice of the
stponement by public declaration at the time and place last appointed for the
Le. No other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the sale is
stponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice of
Le. In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and
noticed in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be
^en.
story: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, § 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ir market value bid.
A trust deed beneficiary's offer of "fair market value" for property sold at a
ustee's sale was the equivalent of a fixed-dollar offer and was therefore a
d for purposes of Subsection (1). As the only bid, it was also the highest
d, and the trustee was required by the statute to accept it. Thus, the trustee
s not permitted to postpone, cancel, or renotice the sale pursuant to
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Database
UT-STANN9*

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES
Copyright ) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
1-32 Sale of trust property by trustee —Action to recover balance due upon
igation for which trust deed was given as security --Collection of costs and
orney's fees.
,t any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed,
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due
»n the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such
.ion the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which
; secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and
: fair market value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment,
i court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property
.d. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the
>unt of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including
istee's and attorneyfs fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as
the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the
availing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney
js incurred in bringing an action under this section.
>tory: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. 68, § 4.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
:orney fees.
:iciency j udgment,
:lusive remedy.
.tiple liens.
:ice.
^-action rule.
:-of-state lands. Preemption by federal law.
availing party.
3cedural failure.
:pose of section.
:ed.
:orney fees.
rrial court did not err in granting debtors attorney fees and costs as the
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1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - ST. GEORGE COURT

2

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

FIVE F, LLC,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

TRIAL
(FOURTH DAY)

vs.
Case
Appeal

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

980501814
20020088-CA

8
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that the trial of this matter resumed

before the above-named court on October 25, 2001.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17
18

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

19
(From Electronic Recording)
20
21

(DAY 4 OF 4)

22
23

ORIGINAL

24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 22-102811-7801
SALEM, UT 84653
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423-2663

1

We, these are in our instructions, but there was a

2

10th Circuit Case stating that the United States has complied

3

with applicable statutes and regulations concerning the

4

assessment of penalties, therefore do not breach its

5

fiduciary duty.

6

920, which I think stands for the proposition if you comply

7

with statutory duties if you, if you act within the law that

8

it can't be a breach of fiduciary duty.

9

It's the Koozwoon (phonetic) case 57 F.3d

THE JUDGE:

All right.

I'm going to take a

10

recess and look over these cases that have been cited and

11

then I'll rule on the motion.

12

We'll be in recess.

13

(Tape turned off.)

14

COURT'S RULING

15

THE JUDGE:

All right.

We're back in session.

16

It's seven minutes or eight minutes to 4:00.

17

not present.

18

The jury is

The parties and their counsel are present.

Because of the way in which the issues in this

19

lawsuit were framed from the outset the Court has refused and

20

been hesitant, certainly, to grant any summary judgment or

21

directed verdict without fully understanding the facts in the

22

case, and especially those upon which the plaintiff relied to

23

prove its claims.

24
25

The Court has afforded the plaintiff the
opportunity of fully presenting its evidence in this case and
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

1

fully discussing the application of the law to the facts

2

presented in the evidence.
It's not appropriate for a Court to weigh the

3
4

evidence in this case in deciding a renewed motion for a

5

directed verdict since the weighing of the evidence is the

6

exclusive province of the jury.
However, the Court has a duty to decide before

7
8

submitting the matter to the jury whether there is evidence

9

before the jury sufficient to allow the jury to determine

10

that the plaintiff is entitled to prevail on its claims,

11

given the applicable law.

12

by considering every fact and indulging every reasonable

13

inference from the facts in favor of the plaintiff, and then

14

asking the question assuming all the facts in this case are

15

as the plaintiff says they are is there any way that a

16

reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor under

17

the law.

18

This decision is is accomplished

I've struggled with that process as we have worked

19

through this case and during this trial because I was not

20

fully advised when the trial started as to all of the details

21

of the ways in which the plaintiff claimed that the bank had

22

breached its fiduciary duty as trustee, or breached the

23

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or received

24

unjust enrichment.

25

Having now heard the evidence along with the jury
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

1

the Court is able to rule on the application of the law to

2

that evidence.

3

Let me digress just long enough to mention that

4

this has been a well tried case by very competent counsel who

5

have done their level best to alert the, the Court as to the

6

law and the facts.

7

courtesy and their professionalism and that of the courtesy

8

of the parties.

9
10

And the Court truly appreciates their

Now the Court must decide how the law applies in
this case.

11

After considering all the evidence in the light

12

most favorable to the plaintiff the Court has come to the

13

conclusion that as a matter of law the jury in this case

14

could not reasonably conclude given the evidence before it

15

that the defendant bank engaged in any conduct which was

16

not permitted under the agreement of the parties or under

17

the statutes of this state applicable to this situation.

18

The steps taken by the bank were allowed by the

19

foreclosure statutes, the order in the bankruptcy court, and

20

the agreement of the parties.

21

So the ultimate question in this case turns out to

22

be whether a bank can be found to have violated its fiduciary

23

duty or to have violated its promise to treat the borrower

24

with good faith and deal with the borrower fairly when the

25

bank does no more than exercise its legal rights under the

FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
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1

law.
Given the evidence in this case and which this jury

2
3

would have to consider, the Court is of the opinion that the

4

law does not contemplate that the bank can be found liable to

5

the plaintiff for the breach of fiduciary duty or the breach

6

of the implied covenant good faith and fair dealing or for

7

unjust enrichment when the bank's conduct is permitted under

8

the law.

9

As to the plaintiff's claims for damages, the Court

10

finds under the foreclosure statute and as a-matter of law

11

that the plaintiff has no right to or claim against the

12

collateral property once it has been sold at a properly

13

noticed and properly carried out trustee's sale which has not

14

been challenged.

15

belongs to the buyer, he or the defendant bank.

16

plaintiff under the statute is not allowed to assert any

17

claim against the bank because of what the bank later does

18

with the property.

19

After that sale has occurred the property
And

Under the facts before this jury the accounting

20

practices of which the plaintiff complains would only

21

matter if the bank sought to pursue a deficiency judgment,

22

which it has not done.

23

that those alleged errors, even assuming that the plaintiff

24

is correct as to those errors, would have changed the

25

outcome of the foreclosure sale conducted by the defendant

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
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1

bank.
In deciding a motion for directed verdict the Court

2
3

is not required to make findings of fact or conclusions of

4

law according to the provisions of Rule 50, Utah Rules of

5

Civil Procedure.

6

labeled.

7

clear the basis or the reason for the Court's decision in

8

this case in the event that the matter comes to the attention

9

of a reviewing court.

I do not intend these remarks to be so

The purpose of these remarks is rather to make

This Court now grants the defendant's motion for

10
11

directed verdict as to all of plaintiff's claims in this case

12

which were tried to the jury for the reasons stated above.
Plaintiff has failed to present adequate proof of

13
14

its claims to get the matter before the jury and the Court

15

finds the plaintiff has no cause of action under the facts

16

and law of this case.

17

dismissed and the jury will be discharged.

Those claims are hereby ordered

18

Would you have the jury join us, please?

19

MR. HATHAWAY:

20

as well to the unjust enrichment claim.

21
22

THE JUDGE:
claim.

I didn't mention the unjust enrichment

We've tried the case as a contract case.

23

MR. HATHAWAY:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

Your Honor, I take it it pertains

Yes.
And so I think the unjust enrichment

claim would be moot at this point.
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
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1

MR. HATHAWAY:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

All right.
All right.

Thank you.
And just so I'm clear, do

you disagree with that, either, either side?

4

MR. JARDINE:

No, Your Honor.

5

MR. HATHAWAY:

I just wanted that clarification.

6

Thank you.

7

THE JUDGE:

8

Please be seated, folks.

9
10

All right.

I appreciate that.
We now have present our

nine stalwart jurors who have been very patient in this
case.
I will tell you now, ladies and gentlemen, that

11
12

we're going to be excusing you at this juncture without

13

requiring you to make any decision.

14

which has terminated these proceedings.

I have granted a motion

I don't want you to walk away thinking you wasted

15
16

four days.

17

issues of this case.

18

presence here, your willingness to hear the evidence as it

19

came in, and to present a forum for the parties to litigate

20

this case has contributed mightily to that resolution.

21

only thing that happened is you didn't have to make a

22

decision which you might have contemplated making at the

23

outset.

They have been resolved and your

The

We want to thank you for your willingness to

24
25

We brought you here on Monday to resolve the

serve.

This is important public service.

Even though you

FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

1 didn't make the call, it's important public service.
2

This

is the way our system works and without you being here it

3 wouldn't have worked.
I'm going to release you from the admonition that I

4
5

previously gave you which means you're now free to discuss

6

the case with anyone you choose, or not discuss it if that's

7

what you prefer.
I hope you'll leave here with a sense of pride for

8
9

having been involved in this, these proceedings.
Benjamin Franklin once said that there are two

10
11

pillars of freedom upon which our democracy rests, the right

12

to vote and the right to serve on juries.

13

had to choose between the two he'd take the right to serve on

14

a jury because it's the opportunity for the citizens of the

15

community to come in and, and hear what's going on in the

16

legal system and correct injustices.

17

you've been involved in.
We truly appreciate you.

18
19

Thank you.

You are

Unless there's something else we'll be in, be in
recess.

22

MR. HATHAWAY:

23

MR. JARDINE:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

And that's the process

free to leave.

20
21

And he said if he

Thank you.
Thank you, Judge.

Thank you.

Appreciate you.

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded.
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber
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James S. Jardine (A1647)
Rick B. Hoggard (A5088)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

V

George W. Pratt (USB #2642)
Marci Rechtenbach (USB #8146)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Defendant Heritage Savings Bank

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 98-0501814

:

Honorable J. Philip Eves

This case was tried to a jury on October 22, 23,24, and 25,2001. Following the
presentation of all evidence by the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant orally moved the
Court for a directed verdict in its favor. The Court took the motion under advisement.

513919vl

Thereafter, the Court advised the parties and their counsel that, in the Court's view, the motion
for directed verdict should be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for a directed verdict is granted.
Judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in accordance with
this order.

DATED this 21

- day of November, 2001.

Honeff able J. Philip E
Approved as to form:

Benson L. Hathawa§J, Jr.
Attorney for PlairffifT^

Gj&rgeTW. Pratt
Attorney for Defendant

5139l9vl
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James S. Jardine (A 1647)
Rick B. Hoggard (A5088)
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
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nv

George W. Pratt (USB #2642)
Marci Rechtenbach (USB #8146)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Defendant Heritage Savings Bank

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 98-0501814
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Honorable J. Philip Eves
Defendant.

Based upon the Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, and
good cause appearing,

513925vl

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this action, and all
claims asserted by the plaintiff in its First Amended Complaint, are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this #-f~

day of November, 2001.

7 <fcg

Honorable J. Philip Eyes
Approved as to form:

»

/

«

•

/

*

o/

Benson L. Hathaway, prj
Attorney for Plaintj

George W. Pratt
Attorney for Defendant
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James S. Jardine (A1647)
ElainaM. Maragakis (A7929)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
George W. Pratt (A2642)
Marci Rechtenbach (A8146)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Defendant Heritage Savings Bank

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,

AMENDED PROPOSED
PRETRIAL ORDER

Plaintiff,
Judge: J. Philip Eves
v.
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

Civil No. 98-0501814

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on at a pretrial conference held on October 4,2001,
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. of the law firm of Stirba & Hathaway
appeared as counsel for the Plaintiff, Five F, Inc. ("Five F"). James S. Jardine of the lawfirmof

Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and George W. Pratt of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbook &
McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendant Heritage Bank ("Heritage"). Based on
proceedings during the final pretrial conference and the hearing on certain pending motions, the
Court directed the parties to file an amended pretrial order on October 17, 2001. The following
action was taken:

A.

JURISDICTION. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. The jurisdiction of the court is not disputed and is hereby
determined to be present.

B.

VENUE. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4

and 78-13-7. The parties agree that venue is properly laid in the Fifth Judicial District Court of
Washington County, Utah.

C.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.
1.

FIVE F'S CLAIMS AGAINST HERITAGE.
a.

Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee under its September 12,

1996 Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F, owed Five F a
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of Five F as Trustor and with a
punctilio of honor.
b.

Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached its fiduciary duty

to Five F, by, among other things, failing to consult with Five F prior to
the trust deed foreclosure sale; by disregarding any interest Five F may
2

have had in the property; and, otherwise by not acting in the interest of
Five F and with a high punctilio of honor.
c.

Five F claims that as a consequence of Heritage's breach of its

fiduciary duty, Five F has been damaged by the loss of the value of its real
property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed, for lost
rents, lost profits, lost future income and other benefits of ownership of the
real property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed. Five
F claims in addition, that it is entitled to its attorney's fees, consequential
damages, and punitive damages.
d.

Five F claims Heritage breached its contract, including its covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, under its September 12, 1996 promissory
note and trust deed with Five F by, among other things, failing to consult
with Five F in the process of its foreclosure and bid preparation; by the
manner in which it accounted for the balance owed by Five F at various
times during the life of the loan; in its calculation of the credit amount bid
at the two foreclosure sales, by failing to give Five F credit for the value of
the real property if foreclosed on, by reaping an excessive recovery for
itself in substantial excess of its contract rights under its note and trust
deed with Five F, and by depriving Five F of the benefit of its bargain with
Heritage under its promissory note and trust deed.
e.

Five F claims as a result of Heritage's breach of its contract,

including its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Five F has been
3

damaged by being deprived of the value of the real property used as
collateral under the subject note and trust deed in excess of the amount
Five F agreed to pay under those instruments, Five F's lost profits, lost
rents, lost business opportunities and anticipated future earnings, its
attorney's fees, costs and consequential damages.
f.

Five F alternatively claims that Heritage has been unjustly

enriched through its excessive recovery in the foreclosure of all of the
collateral pledged by Five F under its September 12, 1996 note and trust
deed and its failure and refusal to duly credit bid Five F's contractual
obligation against the value of the foreclosed real property, and Five F has
been damaged by such unjust enrichment in the amount Heritage has
received from Five F in this transaction, less the amount Heritage was
entitled to recovery in its obligations with Five F.

2.

HERITAGE'S ANSWER AND DEFENSES:

Heritage denies all of Five F's claims. On September 12,1996, Heritage made a loan to
Five F in the amount of $1,200,000, which was secured by a note and trust deed on several
pieces of property, with assignment of rents. Five F promised to repay the $1,200,000 by
December 31, 1996, but failed to do so, prompting Heritage to begin a non-judicial foreclosure
through a Trustee's Sale of its collateral.
In May of 1997, Heritage's foreclosure was stopped when Five F filed a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. Five F proposed a plan of reorganization, which the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah confirmed by order entered February 18, 1998. Under
the plan of reorganization, Five F was required to pay Heritage in full no later than May 31,
1998, or if it did not do so, the confirmed plan expressly permitted Heritage to conduct a
Trustee's Sale on the 10.44-acre parcel securing the Note. That sale was held on July 13, 1998.
Heritage, acting as lender-beneficiary, credit bid $1,090,000, which was the highest bid at the
sale and which therefore Heritage as trustee accepted. Heritage thus acquired title to the 10.44acre parcel and Five F was credited with $1,090,000 against its loan balance. Because there was
a balance still owing on the Note, the plan further authorized Heritage to conduct a second
Trustee's Sale on the four-plex property that also secured the loan. Accordingly, a second
Trustee' Sale was held on August 12, 1998, at which sale Heritage credit bid $210,000. That bid
was the highest bid and was therefore accepted by Heritage as trustee.
As trustee, Heritage did not owe a fiduciary duty to Five F. Five F and Heritage had no
confidential relation. Five F did not rely on Heritage for any business advice. Heritage did not
have a position of dominance with Five F, since it was merely a lender to Five F.
Moreover, Heritage in its role as trustee treated Five F fairly. Heritage fully complied
with its statutory duties as trustee, including consulting with Five F on the order of the sale of the
parcels.
With respect to Five F's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, Heritage asserts that it has fully complied with the terms of its note and trust deed with
Five F and did so in good faith.
Once Five F defaulted on its Note and foreclosure proceedings began, Heritage had no
obligation to bid on the properties at the Trustee's Sale. And even if Heritage elected to bid, it
5

was free to bid an amount it determined protected its interests. Five F's claim fails because
Heritage complied with all of its duties under the note and trust deed. Moreover, Five F could
not justifiably expect: (1) that Heritage would bid at all; (2) that Heritage would bid the amount
of its debt or of any appraisal, especially when it considered the appraisals at best uncertain; or
(3) that it would receive as credit against its loan anything more than the highest bid at the
Trustee's Sale.
As a matter of law, any evidence regarding the collateral property or its disposition after
the trustee sale is irrelevant and inadmissible.
Five F's unjust enrichment claim fails for three reasons. First, an unjust enrichment
claim is precluded when there is a written contract, such as this, the note and trust deed. Second,
even assuming arguendo that this claim is properly part of this lawsuit, it fails as a matter of
fairness. Although it was possible that Heritage would ultimately sell the subject property for
more than the amount it had bid, Heritage also took the corresponding risk that the property
would be sold for less than the amount of Heritage's bid. Under law and equity, Five F is the
party that bears the risks of the Trustee's Sale process. The outcome that Five F challenges was
not unjust because Five F received what it had bargained for, and further, Heritage was not
unjustly enriched because it received exactly what the Trustee's Sale process mandated. Third,
when all of Heritage's default rights and indirect costs are considered, there was no enrichment.
Finally, all of Five F's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Five F
proposed and succeeded in obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan which provided, with
respect to Heritage, that if Five F did not pay Heritage in full by May 31, 1998, Heritage could
then proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the 10.4 acre parcel and then, if it was not paid in
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full from that sale, it could proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the remaining four-plex.
Heritage proceeded in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed plan, was the high bidder at the
first foreclosure sale, where it was not paid in full, and then scheduled the second foreclosure
sale, where it was also the high bidder. Thus, Heritage acquired title to all its collateral through
foreclosure, in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan. Consequently, Five F
is judicially estopped to challenge the validity and results of the foreclosure sales, as it attempts
to do in this suit.

D.

TRIAL OF CLAIMS BY COURT.

Five F's claim of unjust enrichment and Heritage's defense ofjudicial estoppel will be tried
by the Court outside the presence of the jury. Five F stipulates that if its claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust enrichment
claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the defense of judicial
estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury.

E.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by

admissions in the pleadings, by court order pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, or by stipulation of the parties and counsel.
1.

Plaintiff Five F is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of

business in St. George, Utah.
2.

Defendant Heritage Savings Bank is a Utah financial institution with its principal

place of business in St. George, Utah.
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3.

On September 12, 1996, Heritage loaned Five F $1,200,000, and Five F executed

a Promissory Note in favor of Heritage in the amount of $1,200,000.00.
4.

The Note was secured by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, through which

Five F conveyed to Heritage as Trustee, title to three parcels of real property, an undeveloped
parcel consisting of 10.44 acres, and two four-plexes.
5.

Prior to closing the loan to Five F, Heritage had received appraisals on the three

parcels of real property pledged to secure the loan (the 10.44-acre parcel of raw land, and the two
four-plexes), in the amounts, respectively, of $1,640,000.00, $306,000.00, and $306,000.00.
6.

Mr. Fowler was aware of these appraisal valuations at the time of the closing.

7.

Heritage was the Beneficiary and also the Trustee under the Trust Deed, of which

Fowler was aware when he signed the Trust Deed.
8.

Five F defaulted in its obligations under the Note, by failing to pay all principal

and accrued interest by December 31, 1996, as required by the Note.
9.

On February 28, 1997, Heritage as Trustee commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure

proceeding against all three parcels of real property by filing a Notice of Default with the
Washington County Recorder.
10.

At the time of the December 31, 1998 default, Five F owed Heritage on its Note

the full principal amount of approximately $1,200,000 plus interest and costs to be incurred in
foreclosure.
11.

On March 17, 1998, Five F made a partial payment on the loan of $240,000, in

exchange for reconveyance of one of the two four-plexes.
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12.

Heritage's foreclosure proceeding was interrupted when, on or about May 23,

1997, Five F filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
13.

In connection with the chapter 11 proceeding, Heritage assessed its lien against

the real property securing the Note, as well as the rents collected by Five F from the remaining
four-plex property.
14.

In its chapter 11 bankruptcy case Five F sought and obtained confirmation of a

Plan of Reorganization, which was confirmed by order of the bankruptcy court on February 18,
1998.
15.

Five F's Plan of Reorganization provided that Heritage could proceed with its

foreclosure of the property if Five F did not paid Heritage in full by May 31, 1998.
16.

Five F failed to pay Heritage in full by May 31,1998.

17.

A trustee's sale was held on the 10.44-acre tract on July 13, 1998.

18.

At the July 13, 1998, trustee's sale, Heritage credit bid $1,090,000 and acquired

title to the 10.44-acre parcel.
19.

On August 12, 1998, a trustee's sale was held on the four-plex property.

20.

At the August 12, 1998 Trustee's Sale, Heritage credit bid $210,000.00 and

acquired title to the four-plex property.
21.

Heritage sold the four-plex to a third party on about August 20, 1998, for

$280,000.00, yielding net sale proceeds to Heritage of $261,009.10.
22.

On October 6, 2000, Heritage sold the 10.44-acre parcel for $1,682,000.00.
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F.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT- l The contested issues of fact remaining for

decision are:
1.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT:
a.

Whether Five F and its representatives reposed their trust or
confidence in Heritage as Trustee and relied on Heritage's
guidance.

b.

Whether Heritage

was

in

a position

to

exercise

extraordinary influence over Five F in the handling of the loan and
foreclosure of the collateral.
c.

Whether Heritage stood in a dominant position vis-a-vis
Five F in the handling of its loan and the foreclosure of the
collateral.

d.

Whether Heritage as Trustee allowed Five F to participate
in any meaningful way in the Trustee's Sale, including the
calculation of the credit bid, and the calculation of balance owed.

e.

Whether Heritage as Trustee acted in the interest of Five F
with a high punctilio of honor in its capacity as Trustee under its
Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F.

f.

Whether Five F was damaged as a consequence of
Heritage's conduct.

By including various contested issues of fact or law herein, the parties do not agree that such issues are material,
relevant, properly pleaded, or otherwise correct, and specifically reserve their right to argue against such issue at
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g.

Whether Heritage's conduct as Trustee was wanton,
intentional, purposeful or in reckless disregard of the contractual
and legal rights of Five F.

h.

The extent of the income and wealth of Heritage.

i.

Whether there is a probability that Heritage might repeat
the conduct complained of.

j.

Whether as a result of the amounts paid to Heritage by Five
F, together with the value of the real property taken by Heritage in
foreclosure,

Heritage

has

received

the

benefit

of

assets

substantially in excess of the obligation arising in Five F under the
Note and Trust Deed, to the detriment of Five F.
k.

Whether Five F understood that, in the event of Five F's
default, Heritage could foreclose on the property used as collateral,
but that value of the collateral would not be considered as credit
against the loan.

1.

Whether Five F was justified in expecting to be obligated
under its Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Heritage only to
the extent of the face amount of the note, plus interest together
with costs and fees.

trial. Specifically, the parties have included contested issues of fact and law consistent with their prior positions
presented to the Court in its motion, in order to preserve those issues.
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m.

Whether Five F expected to lose all of its collateral pledged
to secure its Promissory Note with Heritage notwithstanding the
actual value of the pledged property and its contractual obligations
under the terms of the Promissory Note.

n.

Whether Heritage determined its credit bid at the sale of the
10.44 acres, by deducting $225,000 from what it calculated Five F
owed it, expecting it could retrieve this amount from a subsequent
quick sale of the four-plex, which decision was made with full
knowledge and consideration of the September 1996 appraisal of
the 10.44 acres in the amount of $1,640,000, the April 1998
appraisal in the amount of $1,830,000 and $1,380,000, and, that by
Heritage's calculations, as of the date of the sale, Five F owed
Heritage $1,314,685.33.

o.

Whether Heritage determined the amount to be credit bid at
the Trustee's Sale of Five F's four-plex by deducting from the
amount it calculated remained owed by Five F an amount
calculated to be the approximate amount of rents which had been
collected and were being held in a reserve account pursuant to the
bankruptcy court's order.

p.

Whether Heritage's conduct in the performance of its
obligations as Beneficiary under its Promissory Note and Trust
Deed with Five F was contrary to Five F's justified expectations.
12

q.

Whether Five F was damaged

directly and as a

consequence of Heritage's actions under the performance of its
obligations under the Note and Trust Deed,
r.

Alternatively, whether Heritage received a windfall outside
of its contractual obligations in the foreclosure and subsequent sale
of the collateral,

s.

Whether Five F intended to bestow the value of the pledged
collateral notwithstanding its value and Five F's contractual
obligations.

t.

Whether Heritage was paid in full upon foreclosure of the
10.44 acres on Five F's obligation under the Promissory Note and
Trust Deed,

u.

What amount is required in equity to make Five F whole as
a result of Heritage's unjust enrichment.

2.

DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT
a.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as trustee conduct the trustee sales in
accordance with the statutory requirements?

(2)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, have and exercise extraordinary influence over
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Five F? If so, did Heritage exercise that influence
unlawfully?
(3)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, because of dependence, weakness of age, state
of mental strength or state of business intelligence, hold a
position of superiority or dominance over Five F? If so, did
Heritage use that position of superiority or dominance
unlawfully?

(4)

Did Five F, separate and apart from its pledge of property
as collateral for its loan from Heritage, otherwise place its
property in the charge of Heritage?

(5)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, have an overmastering influence over Five F?
If so, did Heritage use that influence unlawfully?

(6)

Did Five F, with Heritage's understanding, repose a
continuous trust in the skill and integrity of Heritage, above
and beyond the borrower-lender relationship?

(7)

Were the note and trust deed negotiated at arm's length?

14

(8)

Did Five F request Heritage as trustee to consult with it in
any respect?

(9)

Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F?

(10)

If Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, was
Five F injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee?

(11)

If Five F was injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee, what
damages did it suffer?

(12)

If someone else had been substituted to act as trustee under
the trust deed, would the outcome of the trustee's sales
have been altered in any way?

(13)

By the time the foreclosure sales were conducted, had the
relationship between Heritage and Five F become
"adversarial," such that any fiduciary duties that may have
existed were extinguished?

b.

Breach of Contract Claim
(1)

Did Heritage breach the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing?
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(2)

Did Five F expressly agree in its confirmed Chapter 11 plan
that, in the event Heritage was not paid in full by May 31,
1998, it could proceed with a trustee sale on the 10.4 acre
parcel and then, if the proceeds from the trustee sale did not
pay in full the Note, it could conduct a foreclosure sale of
the four-plex?

(3)

Under the operation of the trust deed and trust deed statute,
was Heritage paid the amount of the proceeds of the trustee
sale or some other amount?

(4)

Did Five F have a justified expectation under its contract
with Heritage, i.e., the promissory note, trust deed, and
confirmed Chapter 11 plan, that if Heritage bid at the
trustee sale, it would bid an amount for the 10.4 acre parcel
equal to or greater than the fair market value, or the amount
of any appraisal it had in its possession?

(5)

Did Five F have a justified expectation that Heritage would
not foreclose, under any circumstances, on all of its
collateral?

(a)

Did Five F ever disclose this expectation to
Heritage?
16

(b)

Did Five F deliberately fail to disclose this
expectation to Heritage to induce Heritage to make
the loan?

(c)

Was Heritage "paid in full" by its foreclosure on the
10.44 acre parcel?

(6)

Did Five F have a justified expectation that in the event of
foreclosure its collateral would not be sold at the Trustee's
Sale to the highest bidder, which amount would be applied
to its debt?

(7)

Would the obligations that Five F seeks to enforce against
Heritage result in a better contract for Five F than the
contract that Five F actually entered into with Heritage?

(8)

Is Five F attempting to establish new, independent rights or
duties that were not created in the parties' contract, or
agreed by Heritage?

(9)

In connection with the two foreclosure sales, did Heritage
fully comply with all provisions of the trust deed and the
foreclosure statute?
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(10)

Did Five F have a justifiable expectation that Heritage
would consult with it about and agree upon Five F's
position on the calculation of the bids it presented at the
trustee sales?

(11)

Did Five F suffer damages as a result of any breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(12)

What damages, if any, were suffered by Five F as a result
of any breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing?

c.

Unjust Enrichment Claim
(1)

Was there an express contract governing the rights of
Heritage and Five F in the event of a default on the Note by
Five F?

(2)

Did Five F confer a benefit upon Heritage through
Heritage's exercise of its contractual foreclosure rights?

(3)

If so, at the time such benefit was conferred, was Heritage
aware of the benefit?
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(4)

Under the circumstances, would it be inequitable for
Heritage to retain any benefit received through its exercise
of its contractual foreclosure rights?

(5)

Did Five F engage in inequitable conduct to induce
Heritage to enter into the contracts or otherwise engage in
inequitable conduct?

G.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to

those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are:
1.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
a.

Whether Heritage as trustee under the trust deed between Heritage

Bank and Five F owed Five F a fiduciary duty.
b.

Whether Heritage breached that duty by failing to act in the

interest of Five F and to accord itself with a high punctilio of honor.
c.

Whether Heritage's conduct was consistent with Five F's justified

expectations under Five F's promissory note and trust deed with Heritage.
d.

Whether Five F's confirmed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan is a bar

to the instant action.
e.

Whether Heritage's duty under the Trust Deed is greater than the

mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default
provision of the Trust Deed.
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f.

Whether Heritage's conduct in foreclosing on Five F's property

comported with all requirements of Utah law.
g.

2.

Whether Heritage has been unjustly enriched.

DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
a.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F as
trustor when its only relation with Five F was as a lender
negotiating with Five F at arm's length?

(2)

In light of Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-27(l)(1988), did
Heritage as trustee have any duty to consult with Five F
about the trustee sale other than as to "the order in which
the trust property shall be sold?"

(3)

Did Heritage as Trustee owe a fiduciary duty to Five F as
trustor under the facts of this case?

(4)

After the relationship between Heritage and Five F had
turned adversarial, did Heritage owe any fiduciary duty to
Five F?

(5)

Can a trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the
collateral property or its disposition after the trustee sale?

20

(6)

Can Five F now seek punitive damages under its breach of
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages
or allege wanton, intentional or reckless conduct in its
complaint?

(7)

Can Five F now seek lost profits under its breach of
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages
and absent expert testimony, evidence of profits of similar
businesses or evidence of subsequent profits?

b.

Breach of Contract Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as lender or beneficiary have a contractual
duty to bid at the trustee sale of the 10.4 acre parcel?

(2)

If Heritage decided to bid on the 10.4 acre parcel, did it
have a contractual duty to bid the fair market value of the
parcel or the amount of an appraisal in its possession?

(3)

Was Heritage as beneficiary entitled to bid an amount at the
trustee sale on the 10.4 acre parcel that it determined
necessary to avoid any risk of loss or protect its own
interests?

(4)

Is the note, trust deed and bankruptcy plan ambiguous in
any material respect? Is parol evidence of Five F's
21

purported expectations admissible where those expectations
are nowhere reflected in the promissory note, trust deed, or
confirmed plan?

(5)

As a matter of law, could Five F have a justified
expectation as to what would be bid or accepted at the
trustee sale other than the highest bid?

(6)

Once the trustee sale under the deed of trust occurred, if it
complied with all statutory requirements, were Five F's
rights folly extinguished with respect to the property sold?

(7)

Can the trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the
collateral property or its disposition after the Trustee sale?

(8)

Does the party's contract in this case - that is, the
promissory note, trust deed, and confirmed Chapter 11 plan
- specifically authorize Heritage to foreclose against the
10.4 acre parcel and then, if not paid in foil from that sale,
foreclose against the four-plex and acquire both at the
foreclosure sales by credit bid, thus precluding any claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a matter of law?
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(9)

By conducting the two separate foreclosure sales in
accordance with the terms of the confirmed chapter 11
plan, was Heritage simply exercising its express contractual
rights, thus precluding the assertion of any claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(10)

Do the obligations that Five F seeks to imply, through the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, result in a
better contract for Five F than the contract that was actually
entered into with Heritage and proposed by Five F in its
chapter 11 plan, thus precluding the assertion of any claim
for breach of implied covenant?

(11)

By pursuing this claim is Five F attempting to establish
new, independent rights or duties, that were not created in
the parties' contract, or agreed to by Heritage?

(12)

Where Heritage fully complied with all provisions of the
Note, Trust Deed, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan and trust
deed foreclosure statute, can it be held liable for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(13)

May Five F introduce evidence of lost profits when it did
not pray for such damages and absent expert testimony,
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evidence of profits of similar businesses or evidence of
subsequent profits?
(14)

May Five F introduce evidence on Heritage's internal rate
of return with respect to its breach of contract claim?

c.

Unjust Enrichment Claim
(1)

As a matter of law, can Five F bring a claim for unjust
enrichment where there is an express contract governing
the rights of Heritage and Five F in the event of a default
on the Note by Five F?

(2)

Was Heritage unjustly enriched through its exercise of its
contractually agreed upon foreclosure rights?

(3)

Does Five F's inequitable conduct in inducing Heritage to
make the loan preclude it from obtaining the equitable
remedy of unjust enrichment?

d.

Other
(1)

Is Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan a bar to any or all of
Five F's claims under a theory of judicial estoppel?
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(2)

As a matter of law, can Five F attack the validity of the
Plan of Reorganization it successfully advanced in its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding?

(3)

Did the Plan of Reorganization, advanced by Five F and
adopted by the bankruptcy court, give Heritage the legal
right to foreclose on the second parcel if it was not "paid in
full" by foreclosure on the first parcel?

(4)

Under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may Five
F recover alleged damages consisting of lost profits and
loss of good will, when such alleged damages were not
specifically prayed for in Five F's Amended Complaint?

(5)

As a matter of law, if Five F's obligation to Heritage under
the Note was not satisfied by the proceeds of the first
trustee sale, was it entitled to proceed with the trustee sale
on the second parcel?

H.

ATTORNEYS' FEES. The parties reserve their arguments, if any, regarding their

right to attorneys' fees and their entitlement to attorneys' fees for later presentation to the Court.
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I.

EXHIBITS
1.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS. Five F's exhibits will be provided to Heritage

by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m.
2.

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS. Heritage's exhibits will be provided to Five

F by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m.
3.

EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF COURT CLERK. Exhibits received in

evidence and placed in the custody of the clerk may be withdrawn from the
clerk's office upon signing of receipts therefor by the respective parties offering
them. The exhibits shall be returned to the clerk's office within a reasonable time
and in the meantime shall be available for inspection at the request of other
parties.
4.

EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF PARTIES. Exhibits identified and

offered that remain in the custody of the party offering them shall be made
available for review by the offering party to any other party to the action that
requests access to them in writing.
5.

AUTHENTICITY. The parties shall file any objection to the authenticity

of proposed exhibits not later than five business days from receipt of an exhibit.
The proposed exhibits are subject to all other objections, if any, by an opposing
party at the trial.
6.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS. If exhibits other than those exchanged

on the date stated above are to be offered, the existence of which could not have
reasonably been anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least
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72 hours before their introduction at trial. The opposing party reserves its right to
object to such exhibits, outside the presence of the jury, by objection at trial or on
motion.
7.

IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITS. Any exhibits to be used for

impeachment of a witness called by an opposing party that are not otherwise
disclosed pursuant to another part of this Order to the extent their use can be
reasonably anticipated, shall be submitted to opposing counsel by 5:00 p.m. on
the day preceding their proposed use, provided that the Court may permit use of
such exhibits on shorter notice upon a showing of good cause. The foregoing
does not apply to the use of documents for impeachment purposes that a party
does not intend to offer as an exhibit. A party may object to the admission of an
exhibit introduced pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph upon a showing of
undue surprise and prejudice caused by the failure of the proponent to disclose its
intended use of the document earlier.
8.

DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS.
a.

Enlargement of Exhibits. Each party may, for demonstrative

purposes, enlarge any exhibit, provided that (i) a copy of the exhibit to be
enlarged has been provided to opposing counsel; (ii) the exhibit has been
properly offered into evidence; and (iii) the exhibit has been received by
the Court. Each party reserves the right to object to use of any exhibit that
has been enlarged. Enlarged exhibits shall be used during the trial only
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and will not be received into evidence and will not accompany the jury
into the jury room, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties.
b.

Other Demonstrative Exhibits. The parties need not exchange or

identify demonstrative exhibits at the time that the parties exchange other
exhibits on October 5, 2001. If a party intends to use a demonstrative
exhibit at trial, it shall provide 24 hours notice to the opposing party so
that objections, if any, to the use of the proposed demonstrative exhibit
can be made and those objections resolved by the Court not later than the
afternoon preceding the day on which the proposed demonstrative exhibit
is to be used.
c.

Summaries of Voluminous Documents. Documents that

constitute summaries pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which may be
offered in evidence, also need not be identified at the time the parties
exchange other exhibits on October 5, 2001. However, the categories of
source documents for such potential summaries should be exchanged by
the parties on October 5, 2001. Such documents shall be numbered as
exhibits. The parties shall provide copies of such summaries that they
intend to offer as exhibits on or before October 15, 2001. The parties may
seek exceptions from the Court for good cause.
9.

USE OF EXHIBITS BY OTHER PARTY. Each party reserves the

right to offer into evidence an exhibit identified by any other party.

28

10.

NUMBERING OF EXHIBITS. Five F may number its proposed

exhibits beginning "P-l" and continuing with the use of consecutive numbers.
Heritage may number its proposed exhibits beginning with the letter "D" followed
by the next consecutive number after the last number used by Five F.

J.

WITNESSES.
1.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary:
a.

b.

c.

Plaintiff will call as lay witnesses:
1.

Ray Fowler

2.

William T. Thurman

3.

Brian Chadaz

4.

Daniel Johnson

5.

Randy Rynearson

6.

Stan McConkie

Plaintiff may call as lay witnesses:
1.

Cathy Fowler

2.

Brent Beesley

3.

Thomas Rich

4.

Any witness called by Defendant

Expert witnesses Plaintiff will call at trial
1.

Derk Rasmussen, RGL Gallagher
136 East So. Temple, Suite 1770
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-0400
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d.

Expert witnesses Plaintiff may call at trial
1.

John K.Bushnell, MAI
3446 Chaparral Drive
St. George, Utah 84790

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary2:
a.

b.

c.

Defendant will call as lay witnesses:
1.

Brent Beesley

2.

Brian Chadaz

3.

Raymond Fowler

4.

Bill Thurman

Defendant may call as lay witnesses:
1.

Kathy Fowler

2.

Kerry Soper

3.

Gary Esplin, City Manager, St. George, Utah

4.

Tom Rich

5.

Any witness subpoenaed by plaintiff

6.

Any witness listed by plaintiff

7.

Any witness called by plaintiff

Defendant will call as expert witnesses:
1.

Merrill Norman

2.

David Thomas

* The parties reserve the right to call any witness listed here by deposition if such witness is unavailable.
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d.

Defendant may call as expert witnesses:
1.

e.
3.

None at this time.

Defendant may call other rebuttal witnesses as needed.

Testimony Offered by Deposition. A party intending to present

testimony by deposition shall designate the portions of the deposition testimony to
be presented not later than October 12, 2001. Cross-designations to such
depositions shall be made not later than October 17, 2001. Further crossdesignations may be made upon reasonable notice to the opposing party, and in
any event prior to trial. Exceptions may be made upon stipulation of the parties or
by the Court for good cause shown.
4.

Other Witnesses. In the event that witnesses other than those listed are to

be called to testify at the trial, a statement of their names, addresses, and the
general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing counsel on
or before October 17, 2001. This restriction shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses
whose testimony, where required, cannot be reasonably anticipated before the
time of trial.
5.

Notice of Witnesses. Each party will provide to the other party two days

advance notice of the witnesses (including witnesses whose testimony being
offered by deposition), and the order in which it intends to call those witnesses on
each trial day, subject to any unforeseeable changes in the length or scheduling of
witnesses.
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K.

REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. Requests for instructions to the jury and

special requests for voir dire examination of the jury will be submitted on October 17, 2001,
subject to further rulings of the Court. The parties reserve the right to supplement their proposed
jury instructions, and such supplementation shall be submitted to opposing counsel and the Court
no later than October 22, 2001. The parties shall submit two hard copy versions of proposed jury
instructions: one with annotations, and the other without annotations, and also shall bring to trial
these proposed jury instructions on computer discs, in Corel WordPerfect 8 format.

L.

TRIAL BRIEF. The parties may submit a trial brief to the Court and to opposing

counsel by October 18,2001.

M.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. Five F filed its First Amended Complaint

on May 11, 1999. The deadline for amending pleadings as established by the Court has expired.
There were no other requests to amend pleadings.

N.

DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed.

O.

PENDING MOTIONS. The following motions are pending in whole or in part:
1.
Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Damages Claims, which the Court took
under advisement.
2.
Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Certain Accounting Documents For The
Five F Loan And Documents Produced By Deloitte & Touche, issues on which
the Court reserved until the time of trial.
3.
The Court took under advisement the issue of whether Plaintiff could seek
punitive damages.
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P.

JUROR NOTEBOOKS. At the commencement of deliberations, each juror may

be provided with a notebook containing materials mutually agreed to by the parties, or otherwise
ordered by the Court. The cost of such notebooks shall be borne by both parties equally.
Q.

SPECIAL VERDICT. The parties will submit a special verdict form to the

Court on October 19, 2001.
R.

TRIAL SETTING. The case is set for a jury trial on October 22-26,2001 at 9:00

a.m. at the Fifth Judicial District Courthouse, Washington County, Utah. Counsel for both parties
shall arrive the first day of trial at 8:45 a.m.
S.

MODIFICATIONS TO PRETRIAL ORDER. The parties may request a

modification of this order as a result of any subsequent rulings by the Court and/or intervening
events that necessitate modification of this order.
T.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. Possibility of settlement is considered poor.

DATED this

day of October, 2001.
BY THE COURT

J. Philip Eves
District Court Judge
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The foregoing proposed pretrial order (prior to execution by the court) is hereby adopted this
day of October, 2001.

614360v3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PROPOSED
PRETRIAL ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, on this | (# -"day of October, 2001 to the
following:
Benson L. Hathaway
Aimee K. Martinez
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P. O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
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PROMISSORY NOTE
Loan # 600416
(Secured by Utah Deed of Trust)
$ 1,200,000.00

September 12,1996

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to pay
to the order of Heritage Savings Bank, at its office located at 95
East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, or at such other place as
the holder hereof may designate in writing, the principal sum of
One
Million
Two
Hundred
Thousand
and
tfo/lOQ—
Dollars
($1,200,000.00), or so much thereof as shall from time to time be
advanced to the undersigned, in lawful money of the United States
of America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at
the rate of Ten and One Quarter
percent ( 10.25
%) per annum
until paid.
Monthly interest payments of $10,250.00t will
November 1, 1996 and again on December 1, 1996.

be

due

on

All sums of principal and interest due under this Note shall
be paid in full on December 31, 1996
Prepayment of principal may occur hereunder at any time and
without penalty. Any partial prepayment made under this Note shall
not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, and
shall not have the effect of altering the size of the regularly
scheduled installments provided for herein.
In the event any installment or payment (including an
installment or payment with respect to which the late charge
provided for in this paragraph has previously been imposed)
provided to be made hereunder, or under any instrument given to
secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby, has not
been paid in full on or before ten (10) days after the payment is
due, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand of and
receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to five percent
(5%) of the entirety of such installment or payment.
In the event:
(1) any installment or payment provided for
hereunder is not paid in full within fifteen (15) days after its
scheduled due date; or (2) the undersigned defaults in tne
performance of any covenant or promise contained herein or in any
instrument given to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced
hereby; or (3) a petition is filed seeking tnat any cf the
undersigned be adjudged a oankrupt; or (4) any of the undersigned
makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; or (5) any
of the undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (6)
any of the undersigned becomes insolvent or undergoes liquidation,
termination, or dissolution; then, in any of such events, the
entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal and interest

owing hereunder, shall, at the option of the holder hereof and
without notice of demand, become immediately due and payable.
Thereafter, said unpaid balance, with interest, shall, until paid
and both before and after judgment, earn interest at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) per annumThe acceptance of any
installment or payment after the occurrence of a default or event
giving rise to the right of acceleration provided for in this
paragraph shall not constitute a waiver of such right of
acceleration with respect to such default or event or any
subsequent default or event.
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any
instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not
satisfied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the
undersigned agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses
(regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether or not
incurred in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment,
or in connection with exercise of the power of sale provided for in
the Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument,
including court costs and reasonable Trustee's and attorney's fees.
In the event of any other legal action regarding this Note, its
terms or the interpretation of its provisions, the undersigned
agrees to pay the costs and attorney's fees of the holder incurred
in connection with any such action.
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note or
in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby:
(1) the rates of interest charges, and penalties provided for
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges, and
penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate equaling
the maximum allowed by law; and (2) if, for any reason whatsoever,
the holder hereof ever receives as interest in connection with the
transaction of which this Note is a part, an amount which would
result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding the maximum
allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as would otherwise
be excessive interest shall automatically be applied toward
reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding
hereunder and not toward payment of interest.
The maker, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice of
protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and
expressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, may be
expended from time to time by the holder hereof without in any way
affecting the liability of such parties. This Note shall be the
Join:: and several obligation of all makers, sureties, guarantors,
and endorser, and shall be binding upon their respective heirs,
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. In the event:
any of the undersigned is a partnership or corporation, each person
executing this instrument: on behalf of such entity individually and
personally represents and warrants that this Note and each
instrument signed in the name of such entity and delivered to

secure the obligation evidenced hereby is in all respects binding
upon such entity as an act and obligation of said partnership or
corporation.
Time is of the essence of this Note and each of the provisions
hereof.
This Note, given in consideration of a loan made by the payee
hereof to the undersigned, is principally secured by a Deed of
Trust covering real property situated in Washington County, State
of Utah.
This Note shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.

FIVE F L.L.C.

Raymoofci K.

CATHY7Q. FOWLER, MEMBER

Fowler

M a n a g i n g Member

BY:

r7~?>L12^^>
CATHY/J7. FOWLcR,
as arPindividual

By:

/ ^\^7P<^nn

Raymond K.Fowler
As an Individual

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Heritage Savings Bank
94 E. Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this 12th day of September, 1996,
between FIVE F L.L.C., as TRUSTOR, whose address is 1342 EAST 1250
South, St. George, Utah 84770, HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, as TRUSTEE,
and HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, as BENEFICIARY;
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property,
situated in Washington County, State of Utah:
^ ^ ^ „ rtrtB--,
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Together with all buildings, fixtures, and improvements
thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges, and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the
right, power, and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness
evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the
principal amount of $ 1,200,000.00 , made by Trustor, payable to
the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner, and with
interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of
Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans
or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or its successors
or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting
that it is secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the
terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES:
1.
To keep said property in good condition and repair; not
to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may
be constructed, damaged, or destroyed thereon; to comply with all
laws, covenants,"and restrictions affecting said property; not to
commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer, or permit
any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other
acts which from the character or use of said property may be
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not
excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part
thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction
of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same
with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with plans
and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all
times during construction.
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed
by Beneficiary setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and
conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon
hereunder.
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2.
To provide and maintain insurance, of such type o r types
and amounts as Beneficiary m a y r e q u i r e , on t h e improvements n o w
existing or hereafter erected or p l a c e d o n said p r o p e r t y .
Such
i n s u r a n c e shall b e carried i n companies approved b y B e n e f i c i a r y
with
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Beneficiary. In event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice
to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment
for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor and
Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part
thereof, may be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction
of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair
of the property damaged.
3.
To deliver to, pay for, and maintain with Beneticiary,
until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such
evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts
of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or
renewals thereof or supplements thereto.
4.
To appear in and defend any action or proceeding
purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said
property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and
should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any
such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including
cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum,
incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5.
To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon
water company stock and all rents, assessments, and charges for
water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said property; to
pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens, with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to
be prior or superior hereto; and to pay all costs, fees, and
expenses of this Trust.
tj,
Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act
as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor
and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may:
Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or
Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such
purposes; commence, appear in, and defend any action or proceeding
purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of
Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge, or lien which in the judgment of either
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost
of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
Lo pay immediately and with demand all oum& expended
hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from date of
expenditure at the rate of ten and one quarter percent (10.25%) per
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby. If not paid within thirty (15) days of written demand,
interest shall accrue at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:

^ ^ ^ ._-.„_ _ ^ _ _ _
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Should said property or any part thereof be taken or
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards,
and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its
option to commence, appear in, and prosecute in its own name any
action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in
connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation,
awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the
proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said
property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after
deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees
to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award,
damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary oi
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Trustee may require.
9.
At any time and from time to time upon written request of
Beneficiary, payment of its fees, and presentation of this Trust
Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance,
for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of
any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee m a y (a) consent to the making of any m a p or plat of said
property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any
restriction thereon; C join in any subordination or other agreement
affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d)
reconvey, without warranty, all or any part^ of said property. T h e
grantee in any reconveyance m a y be described as "the person or
persons entitled thereto," and the recitals therein of any matters
or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof.
Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the
services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents,
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this
Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon.
Until
Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured
hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor
shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable.
If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect
any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have t h e
right, with or without taking possession of the property affected
hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. A l l
persons obligated to pay such rents or other obligations at any
time during the term of this Trust Deed are hereby authorized and
directed by Trustor to pay same to Beneficiary upon demand by i t .
Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect
the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and
authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor t h e
exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall b e , or be
construed to b e , an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy,
lease, or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such
tenancy, lease, or option.
II
Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at
any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a
receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to
the appointment of Beneficiary as such r e c e i v e r ) , and without
regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any
part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid,
and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and
collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any
indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary m a y
determine.
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property,
the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds
of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for
any taking or damage of said property, and the application or
release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant
t o such n o t i c e .
B K 1 0 3 5
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13. T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such
right, and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor
in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby
shall immediately become due and payable at the option of
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Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute
or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of
election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the
obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record
in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof
is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee the note
and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
15. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by
law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice
of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by
law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property
on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of
sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order
as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor
to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of
several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to
the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of
the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the
sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from
time to time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice
of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by
such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale;
provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond
the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be
given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee
shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale,
including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2)
cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale
and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under
the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per
annum from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured
hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto; or the Trustee, in its discretion, may
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the
county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary
shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property,
and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable
attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor Trustee at any tim<
by filing for record, in the office of the County Recorder of each
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed
for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers,
duties, authority, and title of the Trustee named herein or of any
successor Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof
made, in the manner provided by law.
00543735 BK1035
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18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of,
and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
administrators, executors, successors, and assigns.
All
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever
the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine
and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
l!i. Trustee accepts this Trust when tins Iiust Deed, duly
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by
law.
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of
pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action or
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be H
party, unless brought by Titibtee.
>0,

This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the law
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of the State of Utah.
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any
notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to
it at the address hereinbefore set forth.

FIVE F L, I..C

CATHY O ^ W L E R , MEMBER ^ ^

RAYMOND K. FOWLER

Managing Member

STATE OF UTAH
; fJ s .

COUNTY UK WASHlNL/HlN
On the 12th
day of September 1996
personally
appeared before me Raymond K. Fowler, who being by me duly sworn
did say that he is the Managing Member, of Five F L.L.C., a Utah
Limited Liability Company and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said company by authority of a
resolution of its board of directors and said Raymond K. Fowler
duly acknowledged to me that said company executed the same.

tmt

NOTAf ?[7p UBL , c

My-edmmis^?^V^^

LAfcftY T. BLAKE
G e o r g e , UT

s:
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STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the 12th day of September, 199b, personally appeared before me LATHY 0. IdWIl R
who being by me duly sworn did say that she is a member, of Five F L.L.C., a Utah
Limited Liability Company and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in
behalf of said company by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said
Raymond K. Fowler duly acknowledge tor4ae_ttiat said company executed the same.
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Commission Expires:
12-28-97 .
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG (Bar No. 7461)
STTRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST.RICT CO URT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L L C ,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER

v.
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

civil NO. (liOSb lljtj

.

Defendant.

PlaintiffFive F, L.L.C., by and through counsel undersigned, hereby submits the following
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
INTRODUCTION
This case involves a Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff, and payable to Defendant. AS
collateral security for the Note, Plaintiff provided Defendant a trust deed on two parcels of real
property. Plaintiff was unable to pay the principal when due and the obligation fell into default. As
a result, Defendant, pursuant to its security interest, non-judicially foreclosed on one of the parcels
of real property by conducting a trustee's sale. The only bidder at the sale was Defendant, who credit

t

seeking a preliminary injunctioi i, I "iaintiff seeks merely to maintain the status qi 10 di u ii ig the penci sncy
of this litigation, so as to maintain the interests of its business. Any possible harm to Defendant that
may arise as a result of granting the restraining order is clearly inconsequential. Defendant does not
stand to lose the v all ic of the si lb ject propei ty, since it has already received, through non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings, an asset that is worth more than what Defendant bid and subsequently paid
for it. I he fourplex at issi le is i not a higl ily liqi rid asset ai id tl lerefore its v alue is i lot si isceptible to
fluctuations which would injure Defendant's interest in the asset

The instant case presents an

emergency which should not require Plaintiff to make the same showing of hardship that would be
needed to be si IOW n to si istain. a finding in favor of Plaintiff later on in tl lis case. Simply stated, the
hardship that Plaintiff will suffer if the restraining order does not issue outweighs any hardship that
Defei idai it i \ ill likely suffei if the restraii ling order does issue.
C.

Public Interest

The public interest can only be advanced by issuing a temporary restraining ordei iii this case.
If r v v - ,

* »forecloseon Plaintiffs second property without first being required to

apply a fair market value offset to the earlier foreclosure, then Defendant will receive a substantial
windfall as Plaintiff s ei editoi , at Plaintiffs expense and detrimei it. "1 he public interest is i lot sei ' red
in such a situation, since creditors should only be allowed to execute in cases of default on property
for amounts that equal the amount of the outstanding loan balance. . \ . A m L;C demonstrated below,
such -

,(

• .rpose behind Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Under this provision, Defendant is prevented

from making an unreasonably low bid at the earlier foreclosure sale, acquiring the asset below its
value, ai id then foreclosii ig on additional property for the deficiency.
C:\MyFiles\Five F\tro.mem.\vpd
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I ikelihood oj Sue xess on the Merits
A plaintiff moving for a temporary restraining order need only show a reasonable probability
of success on the merits, not an overwhelming likelihood of such success. See Atchison v. Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (lutn v_n. ivM;, Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir 1991)

Such likelihood is otherwise described as "a fair chance of

success oi I tl le i nei its." Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 520 I \2d 344, 349- 50 (9th
Cir. 1975). Where the balance of factors tips toward the moving party, a preliminary injunction may
issue if such party "has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate
investigation " Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir !'l,Kl).
The law governing the instant case indicates that Plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits
i inciei 1) lug tl le instai it actioi i. Ii litially, the general rule govei i rii ig a ci eclitoi \s i ight to ii istigate ai \y
action to obtain a deficiency against a debtor is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1994). This
law states as follows:
^ a n y j j m e w j t hj n three months after any sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due upon
the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action tlic
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by
such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and the fair market
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds
the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1994).

C:\MyFiles\FiveF\tro.mem.vvpd
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"It is cieai I'iuin tliu plain language of [t:
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apply to any action to recover the balance due on the obligation secured by a trust deed, following
a nonjudicial sale." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 ( L L H IV^5 , : emphasis in qi i :>ted
i '. J, w nether the action is judicial or nonjudicial, the fair market value credit provision
.r. s v~-l-32 applies to limit a creditor in foreclosing against a debtor's assets, secured by a trust
* '%-.'.

• .

>

• a deficiency,, As stated by California's appellate coin ts, stati ites si ich as §

57-1-32 are to be read liberally to effectuate the legislative purposes underlying them, including to
prevent a multiplicity of actions and to prevent the creditor from making an unreasonably Jot\ bid at
the foreclosure sale, acquiring the asset below its value, and also recovering a deficiency against the
debtor. See Bank of America Natl Trust v. Graves. 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 290 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996),,,
In this case, Defendant's planned action of selling the fourplex property at a non-judicial
foreclosure sale flies in the face of the policies and the rule stated in § ^ ?-1 • \ " UeIenJ.ini • In. n lo
bid below the 10-acre's fair market value. The property appraised at $1,640,000, as compared to the
loan obligation to Defendant amounted to approximately $1,285 million. Now, after the sale,
Defendant seeks contini led non, ji idicial actioi t to obtain a deficiency against Plaintiff Had fair market
value been bid at the time of the first trustee's sale, a deficiency would not now exist, and Plaintiff
would be relieved of his obligations. As a, i nattei of law, I Maintiff is entitled to have its loai I obligation
to Defendant offset by the fair market value of the 10-acre property as it existed at the time of that
property's foreclosure. Only in this way will the purpose behind § 57-1-32 be fulfilled. See Surety
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v.
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 98-0501814

:

Judge J. Philip Eves

30.

Five F disputes Heritage's Statement of Fact paragraph 30 in the following

particulars. Fundamentally, Five F's claim is that Heritage breached its fiduciary obligations as a
trustee,
by, among other things, not allowing Five F to participate and give
direction in the order in which the property securing the trust deed
was to be sold; by selling the parcels of property at separate Sheriffs
Sales; by acting directly as trustee for purposes of the sale when it
was itself also the beneficiary under the trust deed note; by accepting
a credit bid in an amount substantially less than the value of the real
property; by not taking any action whatsoever to protect the interest
of the trustor in the real property and under its obligations under the
Note and Trust Deed; and, as otherwise shown at trial.
See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, \ 26. By acting as both trustee and beneficiary, Heritage
was able to orchestrate the calculation of its credit bid and facilitate the actual credit bid made on
both the 10.44 acres and subsequently on the fourplex to enable it to consume all of Five F's real
property, which it knew at the time were appraised at values in substantial excess of the amounts
owed and credit bid, and still enable itself to seek a deficiency for the cash rents collected pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Court's order. See Chadaz Deposition, 112:13-116:13, and 125:2-128:21,
Exhibit D. Mr. Fowler also testified as follows:
Q:

Do you claim that Heritage at any point in your relationship
with it attempted to deceive you?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay. Tell me what that was.

A:

When they failed to live up to their fiduciary responsibilities
as trustee. When they under credit bid less than fair market
value for the properties. When they turned-sent their
attorneys to turn down a in-the-bag sale, a confirmed sale,
where all the creditors would be paid. I think-I think there's
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I would have been consulted about the ramifications of the sale of the property." See id., Vol. II,
182:7-183:2. Mr. Fowler testified further that he believed Heritage's failure to approach him with
their intention to low-ball the credit bid was a violation of the duty. See id., Vol. II, 184:5-16. The
sum total of Heritage's conduct acting as trustee and beneficiary was to "put itself in a position so
that it could then foreclose on the second piece of property." See id., Vol. II, 191:16-192:10.
In considering Heritage's fiduciary obligations, it is logically impossible to delineate
between its function as trustee and beneficiary. To this end, it is undisputed that Heritage credit bid
and accepted its own credit bid of $ 1,090,000 at the foreclosure sale of a piece of property Heritage,
as trustee and beneficiary, knew had recently been appraised for as much as $ 1,640,000 and as little
as $1,380,000, when the amount owed by Five F on the Promissory Note according to Heritage's
calculations was at the time approximately $1,314,000. See Chadaz Deposition, 114:14-115:3,
Exhibit D. It is also undisputed that the credit bid amount calculated by Heritage of $ 1,090,000 was
based only on its internal figures for the purpose of leaving a deficient amount sufficient to enable
it to foreclose on the fourplex. None of this information was provided to Mr. Fowler of Five F. See
id., 115:4-116:13.
Similarly, in determining the amount to bid at the subsequent foreclosure sale of the
fourplex, Heritage, determined a credit bid of $210,000 specifically for the purpose of enabling it
to gobble up rents which had been generated at the fourplex and held pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Court order. This bid amount was determined by Heritage knowing full well that it was less than
the amount owed by Five F by about $29,000, and that the Bank had received appraisals of the
fourplex at approximately $306,000. See Chadaz Deposition, 125:2-128:18, Exhibit D. Heritage
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giving rise to Five F's claim. At bottom, Five F has endeavored to perform precisely as it agreed
in its Promissory Note and Trust Deed, namely to repay a loaned principal amount with interest and
attorney's fees.
A.

Judicial Estoppel Does Not Preclude Five F's claim.

The Utah Court of Appeals' language relied on by Heritage in support of its argument that
the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Five F's claim is fatal to, and highlights the absurdity of
Heritage's position. Specifically, the court states that "a party with knowledge of the facts ..." will
not be allowed to take a position in subsequent litigation which contradicts a petition taken prior
litigation. See Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App.
1990). Even if Five F has now taken a position different than it has taken in its confirmed Plan of
Reorganization or at any other point in any other litigation, which it most decidedly has not,
Heritage cannot reasonably suggest that Five F was aware of all of the facts. Heritage had no
meaningful communications with Five F from the time the Note went into default until the present.
Five F did not receive statements or accounting or any other documents aside from the notice of
trustee's sale documents, from the time of default until the commencement of this suit. See Chadaz
Deposition, 137:1-139:3, Exhibit D. Heritage, without the knowledge, consent or notice to Five F,
devised its artifice to enable the foreclosure on all of the property and the assertions of a deficiency
claim on rents collected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order sometime in early July 1998, long
after the Plan of Reorganization was entered into. See Disputed Fact paragraphs 26 and 27 supra.
It strains reason to suggest that Five F upon negotiating its Plan of Reorganization in January 1998,
had to anticipate Heritage's conduct that amounts to a breach of an obligation of good faith, much
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balance owed, plus interest and attorney's fees, though nothing more. This position was in the
language of Five F's Plan:
In the event the real property has not sold by May 31, 1998, or
[Heritage] is not paid the allowed amount of its claim by that date,
[Heritage] may continue its foreclosure proceeding on that property
in accordance with state law. In the event of such foreclosure and
should [Heritage] not be paid in full therefrom, [Heritage] may then
continue its foreclosure proceedings on the fourplex . . .
See Five F's Plan of Reorganization ^ 6.3, Exhibit B, [emphasis added.] Five F does not agree to
anything more than its obligations under its Note and Trust Deed. Second, in order for Heritage's
res judicata argument to succeed, the claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment included in Five F's present complaint, are claims which
"could have been raised" in Five F's bankruptcy proceeding. See Searle at 690. It is unreasonable
for Heritage to suggest that Five F knew, should have or could have known, when it negotiated its
Plan of Reorganization in January of 1998, that Heritage, in July of 1998, would orchestrate its
credit bidding at the foreclosure sale of Five F's property in such a way as to allow Heritage to
foreclose on the 10.4 acres, the fourplex and still seek a deficiency for rents collected according to
the Bankruptcy Court's order.
V.

HERITAGE HAS OBTAINED A WINDFALL FROM ITS COLLATERAL.
Heritage presently owns 10.4 acres along River Road in St. George, Utah, which was

appraised in September 1996 for $ 1,640,000, was subsequently appraised in November 1997 by Dan
Johnson, the Bank's appraiser, at $1,850,000, and was appraised by the Bank again in 1998, when
apparently it was not satisfied with Mr. Johnson's reassessment of the value, at $1,380,000. There
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is no evidence that the value of real property located on River Road in St. George, Utah has gone
down in value since 1996. Johnson Deposition, 33:16-36:19, Exhibit E.
Heritage also foreclosed and credit bid $210,000 on a fourplex which it sold within three
weeks for $280,000. Chadaz Deposition, 129:9-23, Exhibit D. Heritage claims in this action a
deficiency of approximately $25,000 which arises from rents collected by Five F from the fourplex
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order. In addition, according to Mr. Chadaz, Heritage carries
on its books a balance owed on Five F's loan of $1,330,582.74, notwithstanding it has foreclosed
and taken all the collateral pledged under the September 12, 1996 Promissory Note. On the other
hand, Five F has nothing. All of its assets have been foreclosed upon by Heritage and the amassed
amount of rents collected while in bankruptcy are subject to Heritage's claim of deficiency.
Possession by Heritage of all of Five F's real property, together with Heritage's apparently insatiable
appetite for more cash, arises from Five F's September 12, 1996 agreement to repay a loan of
$1,200,000, plus interest and attorney's fees in the event of default as necessary. Heritage has
indeed received a windfall and has been excessively compensated as a consequence of the
unfortunate default by Five F on its Note and Trust Deed. This being so, Heritage still asserts that
it is owed $1,330,585.72, plus the deficiency against the rents it claims in this action. See Heritage
Memorandum, p. 23.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Five F respectfully requests that Heritage's Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,

v.

PLAINTIFF FIVE F'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO HERITAGE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

Civil No. 98-0501814

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

Plaintiff, Five F, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Five F", by and through undersigned counsel,
respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition of Defendant's, Heritage Saving Bank
(hereinafter, "Heritage") motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs first
amended complaint.
INTRODUCTION
Heritage contends that summary judgment should be granted as to Five F's claims of breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and unjust enrichment, since, it reasons, Five F did not provide
an expert witness to define the standard of care as proof of its claims, since it is "[ijmplicit in each

of Plaintiff s claims [that] Heritage breached some duty of care . . . " See Heritage's Memorandum
in Support Page 2. As a threshold matter, "standard of care" is not implicated, by Five F or by law,
in claims brought for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing or unjust
enrichment.

Affording Heritage the most liberal construction of the authorities cited in its

memorandum can, at best, only extend its suggested analysis to Five F's claim of breach of fiduciary
duty. However, while the determination of whether the relationship between parties gives rise to a
fiduciary duty, and whether that duty is breached by the conduct of Heritage as trustee, as previously
determined by this Court, are issues of fact left to the trier of fact; the fiduciary duty, and
specifically that duty between a trustee and a trustor, has been previously established as a matter of
law by Utah Supreme Court precedent.
Further, the testimony of Professor Thomas, proferred by Heritage in support of its motion
is, according to Professor Thomas' own imprimatur, merely his view of how the judge and jury in
this case should hold. Consequently it is improper and should be excluded under Utah Rule of
Evidence 702, 703, and 704. Professor Thomas' fantasy that the "relief sought by [Five F] is not
sanctioned or authorized by any known legal rule or ruling . . ." is, in any event, wrong. As has
previously been fully briefed, argued and ruled upon by this Court the legal basis for Five F's claim
under breach of fiduciary duty exists under the Utah Supreme Court's Rulings in First Security Bank
of Utah v. Banberr)? Crossing, etal, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989); mdBlodgettv. Martsch, 590 P.2d
298 (Utah 1978). Five F's claims for breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing are grounded in St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991)
and its progeny, together with fundamental contract law, known to any first year lawyer. Its unjust
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enrichment claim is grounded in the long-established equitable principles articulated in American
Towers Assoc. , Inc. v. CCIMechanical, 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). Professor Thomas' review
apparently overlooked these Utah Supreme Court decisions.
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS
Five F responds to Heritage's Statement of Undisputed Facts as follows, referencing the
numbers used by Heritage designating "Undisputed Facts" in its Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment.
1.

Five F disputes Heritage's so called "Statement of Fact" paragraph 1. Whether or

not proof of a standard of care is required under the analysis of each of Five F's claims is a question
of law, and not an issue of fact. Further, Five F includes claims in its complaint for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
enrichment. A copy of Five F's Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Whether
a litigant must present evidence of a standard of care through expert testimony in a context of a
breach of fiduciary duty claim is more fully addressed below. As to Five F's claim of breach of
contract and the implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing, there is no divinable requirement
of proof of standard of care. It is Hornbrook Book Law that whether or not a contract has been
breached is determined by the fact finder's application of the terms of the agreement between the
parties, as determined as a matter of law by the court, to the conduct of the parties. If the conduct
is inconsistent with the express terms of the parties' agreement, a breach has occurred. Further, if
one party acts inconsistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the
other, effectively depriving the other of the fruits of its agreement, the covenant of good faith and
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fair dealing has been breached. See St. Benedicts Dev. Co. at 200; Cook v. Zions First National
Bank, 919 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1996).
To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, Five F must prove that it conferred a benefit on
Heritage, that Heritage knew of the benefit, and Heritage's retention of the benefit is conferred under
circumstances as would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit, without compensating Five
F for its value. See American Towers Assoc, Inc. at 1192. There is no requirement of proof of
standard of care through expert testimony as part of the proof required in Five F's Second and Third
Claims for Relief.
2.

Five F does not dispute that it has not retained an expert to testify as to Heritage's

standard of care. Five F disputes, however, that it must, as a matter of law, retain such an expert,
as more folly set forth below.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN SUPPORTING A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT.
Five F does not dispute the legal standard articulated by Heritage in its first point of its

memorandum. Five F has previously satisfied this burden in regard to all the elements of its claims
against Heritage, as determined by this Court in its May 22, 2000 Memorandum Opinion. A copy
of the Courts May 22,2000 Memorandum Opinion is attached hereby as Exhibit "B". The real point
of Heritage's Motion is Five F's failure to offer expert testimony of standard of care, not an alleged
general failure of proof.
II.

PROOF OF STANDARD OF CARE THROUGH EXPERT TESTIMONY
UNNECESSARY IN DETERMINING TRUSTEES LEGAL DUTY TO TRUSTOR.
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Heritage relies on three cases, Keller v. Albright, 1 F.Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1977); Preston
& Chambers, P. C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct App. 1997); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah,
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), to support its argument that Five F must prove standard of care
through expert testimony to prevail on all its claims. Heritage is correct in generally stating that in
negligence cases involving trades or professions outside the knowledge of the lay person, the
standard of care must be established by expert testimony. For example, in Keller v. Albright, and
Preston & Chambers, P. C v. Koller, the plaintiff and defendant/counter claim plaintiff, respectively,
asserted claims of legal malpractice. Both courts cited a long string of cases involving medical
malpractice, architectural malpractice, engineering malpractice, legal malpractice, and insurance
coverage, in concluding "where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by
particular trades professions", expert testimony is required. Keller at 1281 andPreston & Chambers
at 263. In Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, where the finder of fact was ultimately to decide
whether the trustee was negligent in reconveying the trustee property and releasing Wycalis'
corresponding security interest based on a forged request for reconveyance, the Utah Court of
Appeals determined that evidence of the standard of care for trustees might be helpful See Wycalis
at 823. According to the Court of Appeals, Wycalis's claim was at its very essence a negligence
claim, see Wycalis at 825, not one for breach of fiduciary duty. In dictum, the Court of Appeals in
the Wycalis decision, notes, the distinction between a negligence claim as compared to a breach of
fiduciary duty claim as being that a fiduciary is held to a higher standard than one of ordinary care
given the fiduciary relationship. See Wycalis, fn. 9. It continues, "nonetheless, the fiduciary nature
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of care to which a trustee is held, rather than
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to supplant negligence analysis," Id., intimating, perhaps, that were Ms. Wycalis claim one for
breach of fiduciary duty, instead of negligence, she would be treading in an area where the
applicable standard of care "may be established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or prior
judicial decision." [citations omitted]. Wycalis dX%25.
Any question of the applicability of standard of care testimony of an expert in the context
of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court, about one week
after the Wycalis decision inFirst Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,1258
(Utah 1989). In Banberry, the plaintiff challenged the trustee's conduct contending that the trustee
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the defendant Banberry. Id. at 1256. The defendant argued that
the court erred in excluding testimony of an expert witness as to standard of care. Id. In Banberry
the Supreme Court explained:
Banberry offered testimony of two specialists in real estate law to
determine a question of fact: What is the standard of care used by
attorneys in the community in preparing a notice of default, and did
[the trustee] breach that standard? The question before the court,
however, involved a question of law: What is the legal duty a trustee
owes a trustor, and did [the trustee] breach that duty? Questions of
law are to be determined by the court. Based upon the court's correct
determination regarding the question of law, we find no error in its
subsequent exclusion of the expert's testimony.
Banberry at 1258.
As this Court is fully aware, and as it has previously determined, a fiduciary duty may be
found to exist in a relationship between a trustee and a trustor
where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and relies
on the trustee's guidance or where the trustee could exercise
extraordinary influence over the trustor or where the trustee stands in
a dominant position to the trustor, it is possible that a trustee is bound
C \MyFiles\Five F\5TH DISTRlCTNexclude reply opp wpd
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by a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor. [Italics
added].
Banbeny at 1256, citing Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). Whether or not the
relationship exists is a question of fact, and has been determined, as part of the law of this case, to
require a decision of the jury. See Court's May 22, 2000 Memorandum Decision, p.3, Exhibit B.
Further, whether or not the trustee's conduct in this case was to the disadvantage of Five F remains
a factual determination. Id. However, the fiduciary duty itself is not subject to what the standard
of care in the industry might be, but is, as unequivocally articulated by the Supreme Court, "a
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor." Banberry at 1256. In regard to the relationship
between a trustee and trustor, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded:
[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater than the mere
obligation to sell pledged property in accordance with the default
provisions of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat trustor
fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor . . . the ease
and facility of foreclosure under [the trust deed foreclosure statute]
commends it over the more cumbersome form of mortgage which
mut be foreclosed in court, but this very fact imposes upon courts the
duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it which are questioned, and
of setting those aside in which fraud or overreaching has been
practiced by the trustee.
Blodgett at 302. The fiduciary duty in this case has been precisely articulated by the decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court in Banbeny and Blodgett v. Martsch. Five F adds nothing to that by
presenting expert testimony as to what responsibilities are of a trustee in the community as of
August 1998. Further, as this Court has concluded, any lay person can determine by evaluating the
nature of the relationship between Five F and Heritage and considering Heritage's conduct as trustee
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whether or not Heritage acted in the interest of Five F, the trustor, that is, fairly and in accordance
with the highest punctilio of honor. Id.
Five F's claim against Heritage is not grounded in negligence but breach of the legal
fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty, namely the heightened standard of acting in the interest of the
trustor, is established by legal precedent. A fact finder would not in any way be assisted in
determining issues of fact by receiving the expert testimony, and any such testimony should
appropriately be excluded. See Banberry at 1258 and Fed. R.Evid. 702 and 704, Advisory
Committee Notes. Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate on Five F's First Claim for
Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duty. As standard of care is not implicated in Five F's Second Claim
for Relief for breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Five F's Third
Claim for Relief based on unjust enrichment, summary judgment is inappropriate as to those claims
as well.
III.

HERITAGE'S "EXPERT" PROFESSOR DAVID A. THOMAS IS NOT AN EXPERT
ON DUTIES OF TRUSTEE AND HIS TESTIMONY IS APPROPRIATELY
EXCLUDABLE UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702,
Whether Professor Thomas' testimony should be excluded has been fully addressed in Five

F's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Exclude and will not be revisited entirely here. May
it serve to say that, by his own admission, each of Professor Thomas' opinions are simply his view
of how the judge and/or jury in this case should ultimately decide the issues, and is consequently
excludable under long-established American jurisprudence and Utah case law precedent. See Fed.
R.Evid. 704, Advisory Committee Note; State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,607-8 (Utah App. 1998);
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State v. Tenney,9l3 P.2d 750,756 (Utah App. 1996); and, Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225,1231
(Utah App.) cert, denied 821 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
Heritage is hard pressed, in any event, to establish that Professor Thomas is an expert as to
trustee's duties in the foreclosure and sale of commercial real estate in southern Utah as of August
1998. Professor Thomas testified in his deposition that he could not recall ever representing anyone
whose property interest was in foreclosure, see David A. Thomas Depo., 12:2-18, attached hereto
as Exhibit "C", that he "possibly" acted as trustee for an individual client, in fewer than 10 instances
in the 70fs and 80fs. Id. 12:19 through 13:17, none of which ever went to trustee's sale. Id. 14:1316. Notwithstanding a long and prolific career in academia, Professor Thomas has precious little
experience in the world of trustee foreclosures. Id. Little of his research, writing and teaching has
to do with trust deed foreclosure. See Exhibit C, 19:8—32:4. Any opinions stated by Professor
Thomas regarding the propriety of credit bids, the relevancy of factors considered by the trustee and
the impact of appraisals are, even if ultimately determined by the Court to be appropriately
admissible, in a vacuum and without any practical experience or even academic support. Id.
Although Professor Thomas clearly would like to supplant his conclusions of law and fact
for those of this Court and the potential future jury, his opinions add nothing to the fiduciary duty
established by the Utah Supreme Court, namely that one having a fiduciary duty to another, must
act "in the interest o f the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed, Banberry at 1256; fairly and
with the highest punctilio of honor. Blodgett at 302. Professor Thomas' testimony will add nothing
to the jury's determination and whether evidence of fraud or a relationship of trust or confidence,
extraordinary influence or dominant position trigger the heightened legal fiduciary duty, and
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whether Heritage, as trustee, acted in the interest of Five F as trustor, fairly and with high honor,
in its foreclosure of Five F's property. As a standard of care does not come into play in Five F's
Second Claim for Relief on the theory of breach of contract and breach covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and Five F's Third Claim for Relief for unjust enrichment, Professor Thomas'
testimony, even if otherwise admissible, would be of no assistance to the fact finder in hearing and
determining the issues of fact presented at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and to the extent referenced herein, for the reasons set forth
in Five F's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Professor David A.
Thomas, Five F respectfully requests that the Court deny Heritage's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this * ?

day of March, 2001.
& HATHAWAY

BENSON L. HATHAW^
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this °j day of March, 2001,1 caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF FIVE' F'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
HERITAGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, to
the following:
George W. Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(k)-Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

James S. Jardine
Rick B. Hoggard
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(L^Bfand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
GARY R. GUELKER (Bar No. 8474)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,
TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiff,
v.
:

Civil No. 98-0501814

:

Judge J. Philip Eves

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant.

Plaintiff Five F, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits the following
Trial Memorandum of Law to assist the Court to understand and anticipate remaining legal issues
relevant to this case. Specifically, this memorandum will discuss (1) whether a plaintiff must
expressly make a claim for punitive damages in his Complaint in order to receive such damages at
trial; (2) whether the determination that parties to a trust deed have become adverse so as to negate
any fiduciary duties is a question of law or fact; (3) whether to establish a fiduciary duty in Heritage
as Trustee, Five F must prove more than a trustee/trustor or lender/borrower relationship; and (4)
whether Five F is entitled to seek damages for both the value of the property lost and the lost income
associated with such properties.

ANALYSTS
I.

A PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NEED NOT CONTAIN A SPECIFIC CLAIM
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ORDER FOR A PLAINTIFF TO CLAIM
SUCH DAMAGES AT TRIAL.

According to Utah R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2), eveiy pleading setting forth a claim for relief should
contain a demand for judgment. However, this rule must be viewed against the backdrop of Utah
R.Civ. P. 54(c)(1), which states that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings." In other words:
"While under Rule 8(a)(3), supra, every pleading setting forth a
claim for relief should contain a demand for judgment, this prayer for
relief constitutes no part of the pleader's cause of action; a pleading
should not be dismissed for legal insufficiency unless it appears to a
certainty that the claimant is entitled to no relief, legal, equitable or
maritime, under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim, irrespective of the prayer for relief; and, except as to a
judgment by default, the prayer does not limit the relief, legal
equitable or maritime, which the court may grant"
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983) (quoting 6 J. Moore, W.
Taggert & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ^ 54.60 at 1212-14 (2d ed. 1983)). Therefore,
"it is not necessary to claim exemplary [i.e., punitive] damage by specific denomination" if the facts
otherwise support an award of such damages. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182 (citation and internal
quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
This issue is similar to the one faced by the Utah Supreme Court in Behrens, where the
defendant opposed plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive
damages that was filed just prior to trial. See 675 P.2d at 1181-82. The defendant's argument was
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procedural; it claimed that plaintiffs motion had not been presented in writing and was not
accompanied by the proposed amended complaint as required by Utah R.Civ. P. 7(b)(1). On appeal,
the Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument because, under Rule 54(c)(1), a plaintiffs
complaint need not contain a prayer for punitive damages in order to claim such damages at trial.
See id. at 1182 "[I]f the plaintiff were able to adduce the necessary foundational evidence at trial,
she could claim punitive damages under Rule 54(c) without a formal amendment to the pleadings."
Id.
Here, Five F has plead and claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached the fiduciary duty it
owed to Five F pursuant to the parties' trust deed. Under Utah law, under a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty, Five F is entitled to punitive damages if it can prove that Heritage's conduct was
willful, malicious, intentionally fraudulent, or in reckless disregard of Five F's rights under the Trust
Deed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1991 as amended). See also General Business Machines v.
National Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664F.Supp. 1422, 1424 (Utah 1987); and Restatement
of Torts § 874 comment b and § 908. Therefore, assuming that Five F is able to set forth
foundational evidence to support its claim for punitive damages, it is not necessary for Five F to
include a specific claim for punitive damages in its complaint in order claim such damages at trial.
Behrens at 1182.
IL

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AND AT WHAT POINT THE PARTIES
BECAME ADVERSE IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY
THE JURY.

Utah courts have held that a fiduciary relationship may cease to exist when the parties'
relationship becomes adversarial. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064

(Utah 1996); OngInternational (U.S.A.), Inc. v. D &DManagement, 850 P.2d447,454 (Utah 1993)
(fiduciary duty extinguished when partners' relationship becomes adversarial and partners deal at
amis length). Since this issue involves the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it is a factual
question that must be determined by the jury.
While the precise legal duty owed by a fiduciary is a question of law, see First Sec. Bank of
Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989), the existence of a fiduciary
relationship is a question of fact. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "there is no
invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary relationship." First Sec. Bank of Utah
N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 786 P.2d 1326,1333 (Utah 1990). Rather, a fiduciary relationship must
be inferred from the factual circumstances surrounding the relationship. See id. This Court .has
already concluded that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a factual determination. See May
22, 2000 Memorandum Decision, p. 3, citing First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing,
780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1999); an&Blodgettv. Martsch, 590 P.2d298 (Utah 1970). This precedent is
consonant with the United States District Court for the District of Utah, which similarly has
recognized that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a question of fact. General Business
Machines v. National Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F.Supp 1422 (D.Utah 1987). There,
the Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty on
the grounds that there was no fiduciary relationship between itself and the plaintiff. After reviewing
Utah law regarding the creation of fiduciary relationships, the court stated that "whether . . . a
fiduciary relationship was created involves questions of fact." Id. at 1226. Since the plaintiff had
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produced evidence which suggested the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the defendant's motion
for summary judgment was denied. Id. at 1225.
Here, the question of whether the relationship between Five F and Heritage became adverse
and the parties began dealing at arms length goes directly to whether a fiduciary relationship existed
between the parties and when that fiduciary relationship existed. It follows, therefore, since the
issue involves the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it is a question of fact that must be
determined by the jury.
III.

A TRUSTEE UNDER A DEED OF TRUST OWES THE TRUSTOR A
FIDUCIARY DUTY SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES TRUSTEETRUSTOR RELATIONSHIP.

A trustee under a deed of trust always owes the trustor a fiduciary duty to treat the trustor
fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor, and to act in the trustor's best interest.
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater
than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default provision of the
trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio
of honor." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). This duty exists and is inherent in
the trustee/trustor relationship itself. According to Blodgett v. Martsch, and the cases cited there,
merely by virtue of the trustor to trustee relationship, given the ease of foreclosure outside of a
juridical process, the relationship is to be carefully scrutinized and gives rise to a duty in the trustee
to act fairly and according with the high punctilio of honor. Blodgett at 302.
In addition to this duty of fairness and honor, the Banberiy Court stated that a trust deed
trustee has an expanded duty to act in the trustor's "best interest":

-S-

[i]n cases where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee
and relies on the trustee's guidance or where the trustee could
exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor,. . .
Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256. These conditions do not abrogate the fundamental fiduciary nature of
the relationship between the trustee and trustor, and the trustee's inherent duty to treat the trustor
with fairness and honor. See Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Rather, these duties exist solely by virtue
of the parties' trustee-trustor relationship. By the same token, the relationship of a trustor to a
trustee is, of itself, evidence of the existence of the fiduciary relationship and satisfies one if not all
of the Banberry requirements. See supra. Moreover, there is nothing in the Blodgett v. Martsch
decision or Banbeny decision which requires a showing of a relationship in addition to
trustor/trustee, to satisfy the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See supra. In fact, the Utah
Supreme Court in the Banberry II decision considering the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between a borrower and a lender, notably not between the trustor and trustee, cited with approval
the following:
Generally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or
authority of the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary.
Banberry, 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) citing Dennis on State
Bankv. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982).
It continued
But it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not only
confidence of one in the other, but there must exist a certain
inequality, dependence, . . . or other conditions, giving to one
advantage over the other.
Id. quoting Dennison State Bank, at 1241. After applying those principles, the Supreme Court in
Banbeny II concluded that no such evidence existed in the relationship between the lender and
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borrower, and consequently concluded that no fiduciary obligation existed. In this case, the very
nature of the trustee/trustor relationship is based on the conveyance of the trustor to the trustee of
the trustor's real property used as collateral securing trustor's performance under the promissory
note and trust deed. This fundamental difference distinguishes the relationship from that of a
borrower to a lender. That fact in and of itself satisfies not only the Banberry land II requirements
but the requirements of Blodgett v. Martsch which result in the springing into existence of fiduciary
duties articulated in those cases. In the end, the relationship of the trustee to a trustor is
fundamentally different from that of strictly a borrower and lender and satisfies the requirements
for the creation of the fiduciary duty as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court.
IV.

IN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY THAT RESULTS IN A
LOSS OF PROPERTY, THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
BOTH THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY LOST AND LOST PROFITS.

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a tort cause of action. See Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795,799 (Utah 1985). "The general objective of tort law [is] to place an injured
person in a position as nearly as possible to the position he would have occupied but for the
defendant's tort

" Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 1984). Therefore, an

injured plaintiff is entitled to recover "all damages, whether special or general, which are casually
connected to a party's tortious action." Id.
In tort causes of action involving the loss of use of property, Utah courts have emphasized
that a plaintiff is not only entitled to the value of the property lost, but also any profits the plaintiff
lost by virtue of being deprived of such property. To illustrate this point, the Utah Supreme Court
relied on the case of State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1973) and stated as follows:
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[T]he measure of damages for loss of use of property was set out in
State v. Stanley . . . . Stanley had lost his crab fishing boat as a result
of the state's negligence. Damages were awarded for loss of use for
18 months, the period required to replace the vessel. After
recognizing the general objective of tort law to place an injured
person in a position nearly as possible to the position he would have
occupied but for the defendant's tort, the court applied that objective
to the loss of a vessel: "[Tjhe damages would be the vessel's share of"
gross earnings reasonably anticipated for the period involved,... less
the expenditures which would have been chargeable to the owner."
Acculog, 692 P.2d at 731.
This concept of lost profits has also been applied in cases involving a breach of duty
connected to the sale of real estate. In United States v. Bald Eagle Realty, 21 F.Supp.2d 1332
(D.Utah 1998), land developers brought an action against a real estate broker in which they claimed
a breach of the broker's duty to deal fairly with prospective purchasers. The developers sought to
recover the profits they would earned from the future development of the property but for the
defendant's breach. See id. at 1334. In response, the defendant moved for summary judgment
claiming that the developers' damages must be measured by the difference between the property's
fair market value at the time of sale and the amount bid by the developers. See id. In its decision,
the Court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion and allowed the developers to seek lost
profits. In doing so, the court stated:
"The liability of real estate agents, brokers and salespersons, as in all
actions predicated upon the failure to perform some duty, sounds in
tort. In tort cases damages are generally awarded in order to
compensate claimants for loss. The measure of damages is the
amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately
caused by the breach of the duty"
Id. at 1336 (quoting Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981)).
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Here, as in Bald Eagle, Five F has brought a tort claim against Heritage for breach of
fiduciary duty. Therefore, if successful, Five F is entitled to recover for all the detriment caused by
Heritage's breach, including the value of the rental property lost, together with the lost profits which
would have been generated during the period in which the loss occurred.
DATED this /$"""day of October, 2001.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

BENSON L. HATHAW)
GARY R. GUELKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

-9-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /f~ day of October, 2001,1 caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW, by the method indicated below, to the
following:
George W. Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
j^fHand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

James S. Jardine
Rick B. Hoggard
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
^fHand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

j \ _ yJLK^J^Hu-ip^O-Urf

-10-

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - ST. GEORGE COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

[FIVE F, LLC,
Plaintiff,

) TRIAL
) (DAY ONE)
)

VS.

HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

) Case
) Appeal

Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED

980501814
20020088-CA

) Judge J. Philip Eves

that this matter came on for trial

jbefo:re the above-named court on October 22, 2001

-

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
[counsel, the following proceedings were held:

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
(From Electronic Recording)

(DAY 1 OF 4)

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 22-102811- 7801
SALEM, UT 84653
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423 -2663
PAGE 1

1

at the end of the case including all of the instructions I

2

will have given you during the trial.
Please listen carefully because you won't get a

3
4

chance to review these written instructions until the end of

5

the case and you need to have these concepts in mind as we go

6

through the trial.
(Initial instructions read to the jury.)

7

THE JUDGE:

8
9
10

Other instructions will follow the

presentation of evidence in this case.
statements?

11

MR. HATHAWAY:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

Ready for opening

jury.

Yes, Your Honor.
Mr. Hathaway, you may address the

Thank you, Mr. Jardine.
OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. HATHAWAY

14

MR. HATHAWAY:

15

Ladies and gentlemen, Your Honor,

16

Counsel.

Let me first thank all of you for responding to

17

this call for your civic duty and also for your making

18

arrangements to spend the next couple of days with us.

19

Thank you (short inaudible, no mic), thank you as well on

20

behalf of my client.
Five F, the plaintiff in this lawsuit, is a limited

21
22

liability company.

It's a company that was set up to engage

23

in the development of real estate here in the St. George

24

area.

25

counsel table with me, his wife Cathy, and their three

Five F consisted of Ray Fowler who's sitting here at
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Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber
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THE JUDGE:

1
2

time.
MR. JARDINE:

3
4

Okay.

So that would be our

position, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

5
6

I think I'd rather take them one at a

All right.

Mr. Hathaway, your

response?

7

RESPONSE BY MR. HATHAWAY

8

MR. HATHAWAY:

Your Honor, this Court has

9

concluded once in a memorandum decision and several times

10

since then in our discussions with the, the, and in other

1 1 motions, what the bases are for a finding of fiduciary
12

duty.

13

And I, I think it's helpful to read the

14

Blodgett-Marsh (phonetic) case in conjunction with, with the

15

Banbury case which was cited (inaudible word) and as a basis

16

in that.

17
18
19

THE JUDGE:

I just reviewed them over the lunch

hour.
MR. HATHAWAY:

Well then you know, Your Honor,

20

that one of the problems recognized by Blodgett-Marsh

21

(phonetic) was the ease with which a trustee may facilitate

22

foreclosures compared to the more burdensome mortgage.

23

Under that circumstance and under that case it seemed, it

24

seemed that the relationship of itself might be apprise

25

(phonetic) to that, to a fiduciary obligations.
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 24, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

It didn't

RESPONSE

1
2

MR. HATHAWAY:

BY MR. HATHAWAY
Well, first of all, as I understand

3

the (inaudible word) of a 54 (b) or (c) motion it is that

4

there is just a failing of evidence, no evidence to support

5

any of the claims.

6

the legal theories and the legal claims.

7

We have, we have logged that they had

Under the breach of covenant and good faith and

8

fair dealing simply is first, there is an inherent obligation

9

in all contracts.

10

Second, in order to determine whether or not it's

11

been complied with, I step forward one.

12

is that no one will intentionally do anything which

13

contravenes the justified expectations of the other party

14

under the contract.

15

The second is that,

The third is we, you look at the contract and the

16

course of conduct of the people.

17

a review of the contract documents.

18

this and debated it.

19

compliance with the contract terms, strict compliance with

20

the statutory provisions of themselves don't satisfy the

21

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

22

It's not...

It's, it's not limited to
We have, we have argued
In other words, strict

I cited the case, and I was trying to find it

23

quickly, and with another moment I could probably find it.

24

But the Utah Supreme Court has said when one party to a

25

contract retains discretion that he can exercise unilaterally
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 24, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

On that basis, Your Honor, I think there is

1
2

evidence that a justifiable expectation was derived, he was

3

derived of with respect to that issue.
And with respect to the last point Mr. Hathaway

4
5

made about the bank charging late fees, if we're entitled to

6

it under the contract that's a perfect example that if we

7

choose to charge fees we're entitled to under the contract.

8

We're not precluded by the implied covenant for doing that to

9

our detriment.

THE JUDGE:

10
11

And s o —
Which late fees are you talking

about?
MR. JARDINE:

12

I think he said in his argument to

13

you that we had this discretion to charge late fees like the

14

5% late fee charge.

15

charge the fees then I think we're entitled

16

can't imply

17

doctrine.

So if the contract gave us the right to
to do it and we

a covenant to the contrary under this

18

So that would be our argument, Your Honor.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

23
24
25

Are there, is there any other

portion of your motion you'd like to address at this time?
MR. JARDINE:

21
22

Okay.

I think those are the only two, Your

Honor.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Anything further you want

to say, Mr. Hathaway, in reply to this l a s t —
RESPONSE BY MR. HATHAWAY
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 24, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber
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1

subsequent sale of the property.".

2

And the other two cases we've given are to that

3

effect.

4

And since their only damage claim they've put

5

forward to the jury is to recover excess, alleged excess

6

recovery after the sale occurred we believe that's a failure

7

of proof of damages, and we'd move on that basis.
We've, we've briefed, Your Honor.

8
9

I'll just note

it for the Court that we think the bankruptcy court order

10

constitutes judicial estoppel and how we proceeded and to the

11

same effect of the trust deeds.

12

And that would be the basis of our motion.

13

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Do you need a minute to

14

think about those cases or read them before you respond,

15

Mr. Hathaway?
ARGUMENT BY MR. HATHAWAY

16
17

MR. HATHAWAY:

18

depends.

19

initially.

20

Well a, I guess, Your Honor, that

But I want to make one distinction at least

And let me address the, the judicial estoppel claim

21

first.

22

Court in a prior motion for summary judgment proceeding.

23

least it was argued and briefed.

24
25

I believe that's already been ruled upon by this
At

In regard to these claims, Your Honor, the
confusion comes in confusing the, the damage theory for the
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIVE F, L.L.C.,

AMENDED PROPOSED
PRETRIAL ORDER

Plaintiff,
Judge: J. Philip Eves
v.
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK,

Civil No. 98-0501814

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on at a pretrial conference held on October 4,2001,
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. of the law firm of Stirba & Hathaway
appeared as counsel for the Plaintiff, Five F, Inc. ("Five F"). James S. Jardine of the law firm of

Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and George W. Pratt of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbook &
McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendant Heritage Bank ("Heritage"). Based on
proceedings during the final pretrial conference and the hearing on certain pending motions, the
Court directed the parties to file an amended pretrial order on October 17,2001. The following
action was taken:

A.

JURISDICTION. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. The jurisdiction of the court is not disputed and is hereby
determined to be present.

B.

VENUE. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4

and 78-13-7. The parties agree that venue is properly laid in the Fifth Judicial District Court of
Washington County, Utah.

C.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.
1.

FIVE F'S CLAIMS AGAINST HERITAGE.
a.

Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee under its September 12,

1996 Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F, owed Five F a
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of Five F as Trustor and with a
punctilio of honor.
b.

Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached its fiduciary duty

to Five F, by, among other things, failing to consult with Five F prior to
the trust deed foreclosure sale; by disregarding any interest Five F may
2

have had in the property; and, otherwise by not acting in the interest of
Five F and with a high punctilio of honor.
c.

Five F claims that as a consequence of Heritage's breach of its

fiduciary duty, Five F has been damaged by the loss of the value of its real
property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed, for lost
rents, lost profits, lost future income and other benefits of ownership of the
real property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed. Five
F claims in addition, that it is entitled to its attorney's fees, consequential
damages, and punitive damages.
d.

Five F claims Heritage breached its contract, including its covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, under its September 12, 1996 promissory
note and trust deed with Five F by, among other things, failing to consult
with Five F in the process of its foreclosure and bid preparation; by the
manner in which it accounted for the balance owed by Five F at various
times during the life of the loan; in its calculation of the credit amount bid
at the two foreclosure sales, by failing to give Five F credit for the value of
the real property if" foreclosed on, by reaping an excessive recovery for
itself in substantial excess of its contract rights under its note and trust
deed with Five F, and by depriving Five F of the benefit of its bargain with
Heritage under its promissory note and trust deed.
e.

Five F claims as a result of Heritage's breach of its contract,

including its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Five F has been
3

damaged by being deprived of the value of the real property used as
collateral under the subject note and trust deed in excess of the amount
Five F agreed to pay under those instruments, Five F's lost profits, lost
rents, lost business opportunities and anticipated future earnings, its
attorney's fees, costs and consequential damages.
f.

Five F alternatively claims that Heritage has been unjustly

enriched through its excessive recovery in the foreclosure of all of the
collateral pledged by Five F under its September 12, 1996 note and trust
deed and its failure and refusal to duly credit bid Five F's contractual
obligation against the value of the foreclosed real property, and Five F has
been damaged by such unjust enrichment in the amount Heritage has
received from Five F in this transaction, less the amount Heritage was
entitled to recovery in its obligations with Five F.

2.

HERITAGE'S ANSWER AND DEFENSES:

Heritage denies all of Five F's claims. On September 12, 1996, Heritage made a loan to
Five F in the amount of $1,200,000, which was secured by a note and trust deed on several
pieces of property, with assignment of rents. Five F promised to repay the $1,200,000 by
December 31, 1996, but failed to do so, prompting Heritage to begin a non-judicial foreclosure
through a Trustee's Sale of its collateral.
In May of 1997, Heritage's foreclosure was stopped when Five F filed a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. Five F proposed a plan of reorganization, which the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah confirmed by order entered February 18,1998. Under
the plan of reorganization, Five F was required to pay Heritage in full no later than May 31,
1998, or if it did not do so, the confirmed plan expressly permitted Heritage to conduct a
Trustee's Sale on the 10.44-acre parcel securing the Note. That sale was held on July 13,1998.
Heritage, acting as lender-beneficiary, credit bid $1,090,000, which was the highest bid at the
sale and which therefore Heritage as trustee accepted. Heritage thus acquired title to the 10.44acre parcel and Five F was credited with $1,090,000 against its loan balance. Because there was
a balance still owing on the Note, the plan further authorized Heritage to conduct a second
Trustee's Sale on the four-plex property that also secured the loan. Accordingly, a second
Trustee' Sale was held on August 12, 1998, at which sale Heritage credit bid $210,000. That bid
was the highest bid and was therefore accepted by Heritage as trustee.
As trustee, Heritage did not owe a fiduciary duty to Five F. Five F and Heritage had no
confidential relation. Five F did not rely on Heritage for any business advice. Heritage did not
have a position of dominance with Five F, since it was merely a lender to Five F.
Moreover, Heritage in its role as trustee treated Five F fairly. Heritage fully complied
with its statutory duties as trustee, including consulting with Five F on the order of the sale of the
parcels.
With respect to Five F's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, Heritage asserts that it has fully complied with the terms of its note and trust deed with
Five F and did so in good faith.
Once Five F defaulted on its Note and foreclosure proceedings began, Heritage had no
obligation to bid on the properties at the Trustee's Sale. And even if Heritage elected to bid, it
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was free to bid an amount it determined protected its interests. Five F's claim fails because
Heritage complied with all of its duties under the note and trust deed. Moreover, Five F could
not justifiably expect: (1) that Heritage would bid at all; (2) that Heritage would bid the amount
of its debt or of any appraisal, especially when it considered the appraisals at best uncertain; or
(3) that it would receive as credit against its loan anything more than the highest bid at the
Trustee's Sale.
As a matter of law, any evidence regarding the collateral property or its disposition after
the trustee sale is irrelevant and inadmissible.
Five F's unjust enrichment claim fails for three reasons. First, an unjust enrichment
claim is precluded when there is a written contract, such as this, the note and trust deed. Second,
even assuming arguendo that this claim is properly part of this lawsuit, it fails as a matter of
fairness. Although it was possible that Heritage would ultimately sell the subject property for
more than the amount it had bid, Heritage also took the corresponding risk that the property
would be sold for less than the amount of Heritage's bid. Under law and equity, Five F is the
party that bears the risks of the Trustee's Sale process. The outcome that Five F challenges was
not unjust because Five F received what it had bargained for, and further, Heritage was not
unjustly enriched because it received exactly what the Trustee's Sale process mandated. Third,
when all of Heritage's default rights and indirect costs are considered, there was no enrichment.
Finally, all of Five F's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Five F
proposed and succeeded in obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan which provided, with
respect to Heritage, that if Five F did not pay Heritage in full by May 31, 1998, Heritage could
then proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the 10.4 acre parcel and then, if it was not paid in
6

full from that sale, it could proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the remaining four-plex.
Heritage proceeded in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed plan, was the high bidder at the
first foreclosure sale, where it was not paid in full, and then scheduled the second foreclosure
sale, where it was also the high bidder. Thus, Heritage acquired title to all its collateral through
foreclosure, in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan. Consequently, Five F
is judicially estopped to challenge the validity and results of the foreclosure sales, as it attempts
to do in this suit.

D.

TRIAL OF CLAIMS BY COURT.

Five F's claim of unjust enrichment and Heritage's defense ofjudicial estoppel will be tried
by the Court outside the presence of the jury. Five F stipulates that if its claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust enrichment
claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the defense ofjudicial
estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury.

E.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by

admissions in the pleadings, by court order pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, or by stipulation of the parties and counsel.
1.

Plaintiff Five F is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of

business in St. George, Utah.
2.

Defendant Heritage Savings Bank is a Utah financial institution with its principal

place of business in St. George, Utah.
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3.

On September 12,1996, Heritage loaned Five F $1,200,000, and Five F executed

a Promissory Note in favor of Heritage in the amount of $1,200,000.00.
4.

The Note was secured by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, through which

Five F conveyed to Heritage as Trustee, title to three parcels of real property, an undeveloped
parcel consisting of 10.44 acres, and two four-plexes.
5.

Prior to closing the loan to Five F, Heritage had received appraisals on the three

parcels of real property pledged to secure the loan (the 10.44-acre parcel of raw land, and the two
four-plexes), in the amounts, respectively, of $1,640,000.00, $306,000.00, and $306,000.00.
6.

Mr. Fowler was aware of these appraisal valuations at the time of the closing.

7.

Heritage was the Beneficiary and also the Trustee under the Trust Deed, of which

Fowler was aware when he signed the Trust Deed.
8.

Five F defaulted in its obligations under the Note, by failing to pay all principal

and accrued interest by December 31, 1996, as required by the Note.
9.

On February 28, 1997, Heritage as Trustee commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure

proceeding against all three parcels of real property by filing a Notice of Default with the
Washington County Recorder.
10.

At the time of the December 31, 1998 default, Five F owed Heritage on its Note

the full principal amount of approximately $1,200,000 plus interest and costs to be incurred in
foreclosure.
11.

On March 17,1998, Five F made a partial payment on the loan of $240,000, in

exchange for reconveyance of one of the two four-plexes.
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12.

Heritage's foreclosure proceeding was interrupted when, on or about May 23,

1997, Five F filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
13.

In connection with the chapter 11 proceeding, Heritage assessed its lien against

the real property securing the Note, as well as the rents collected by Five F from the remaining
four-plex property.
14.

In its chapter 11 bankruptcy case Five F sought and obtained confirmation of a

Plan of Reorganization, which was confirmed by order of the bankruptcy court on February 18,
1998.
15.

Five F's Plan of Reorganization provided that Heritage could proceed with its

foreclosure of the property if Five F did not paid Heritage in full by May 31,1998.
16.

Five F failed to pay Heritage in full by May 31,1998.

17.

A trustee's sale was held on the 10.44-acre tract on July 13, 1998.

18.

At the July 13,1998, trustee's sale, Heritage credit bid $1,090,000 and acquired

title to the 10.44-acre parcel.
19.

On August 12, 1998, a trustee's sale was held on the four-plex property.

20.

At the August 12, 1998 Trustee's Sale, Heritage credit bid $210,000.00 and

acquired title to the four-plex property.
21.

Heritage sold the four-plex to a third party on about August 20, 1998, for

$280,000.00, yielding net sale proceeds to Heritage of $261,009.10.
22.

On October 6, 2000, Heritage sold the 10.44-acre parcel for $1,682,000.00.
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F.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. l The contested issues of fact remaining for

decision are:
1.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT:
a.

Whether Five F and its representatives reposed their trust or
confidence in Heritage as Trustee and relied on Heritage's
guidance.

b.

Whether

Heritage

was

in

a position

to

exercise

extraordinary influence over Five F in the handling of the loan and
foreclosure of the collateral.
c.

Whether Heritage stood in a dominant position vis-a-vis
Five F in the handling of its loan and the foreclosure of the
collateral.

d.

Whether Heritage as Trustee allowed Five F to participate
in any meaningful way in the Trustee's Sale, including the
calculation of the credit bid, and the calculation of balance owed.

e.

Whether Heritage as Trustee acted in the interest of Five F
with a high punctilio of honor in its capacity as Trustee under its
Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F.

f.

Whether Five F was damaged as a consequence of
Heritage's conduct.

1

By including various contested issues of fact or law herein, the parties do not agree that such issues are material,
relevant, properly pleaded, or otherwise correct, and specifically reserve their right to argue against such issue at
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g.

Whether Heritage's conduct as Trustee was wanton,
intentional, purposeful or in reckless disregard of the contractual
and legal rights of Five F.

h.

The extent of the income and wealth of Heritage.

i.

Whether there is a probability that Heritage might repeat
the conduct complained of.

j.

Whether as a result of the amounts paid to Heritage by Five
F, together with the value of the real property taken by Heritage in
foreclosure,

Heritage

has

received

the benefit

of

assets

substantially in excess of the obligation arising in Five F under the
Note and Trust Deed, to the detriment of Five F.
k.

Whether Five F understood that, in the event of Five F's
default, Heritage could foreclose on the property used as collateral,
but that value of the collateral would not be considered as credit
against the loan.

1.

Whether Five F was justified in expecting to be obligated
under its Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Heritage only to
the extent of the face amount of the note, plus interest together
with costs and fees.

trial. Specifically, the parties have included contested issues of fact and law consistent with their prior positions
presented to the Court in its motion, in order to preserve those issues.
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m.

Whether Five F expected to lose all of its collateral pledged
to secure its Promissory Note with Heritage notwithstanding the
actual value of the pledged property and its contractual obligations
under the terms of the Promissory Note.

n.

Whether Heritage determined its credit bid at the sale of the
10.44 acres, by deducting $225,000 from what it calculated Five F
owed it, expecting it could retrieve this amount from a subsequent
quick sale of the four-plex, which decision was made with full
knowledge and consideration of the September 1996 appraisal of
the 10.44 acres in the amount of $1,640,000, the April 1998
appraisal in the amount of $1,830,000 and $1,380,000, and, that by
Heritage's calculations, as of the date of the sale, Five F owed
Heritage $1,314,685.33.

o.

Whether Heritage determined the amount to be credit bid at
the Trustee's Sale of Five F's four-plex by deducting from the
amount it calculated remained owed by Five F an amount
calculated to be the approximate amount of rents which had been
collected and were being held in a reserve account pursuant to the
bankruptcy court's order.

p.

Whether Heritage's conduct in the performance of its
obligations as Beneficiary under its Promissory Note and Trust
Deed with Five F was contrary to Five F's justified expectations.
12

q.

Whether Five F was damaged

directly and as a

consequence of Heritage's actions under the performance of its
obligations under the Note and Trust Deed.
r.

Alternatively, whether Heritage received a windfall outside
of its contractual obligations in the foreclosure and subsequent sale
of the collateral,

s.

Whether Five F intended to bestow the value of the pledged
collateral notwithstanding its value and Five F's contractual
obligations,

t.

Whether Heritage was paid in full upon foreclosure of the
10.44 acres on Five F's obligation under the Promissory Note and
Trust Deed,

u.

What amount is required in equity to make Five F whole as
a result of Heritage's unjust enrichment.

2.

DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT
a.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as trustee conduct the trustee sales in
accordance with the statutory requirements?

(2)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, have and exercise extraordinary influence over
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Five F? If so, did Heritage exercise that influence
unlawfully?
(3)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, because of dependence, weakness of age, state
of mental strength or state of business intelligence, hold a
position of superiority or dominance over Five F? If so, did
Heritage use that position of superiority or dominance
unlawfully?

(4)

Did Five F, separate and apart from its pledge of property
as collateral for its loan from Heritage, otherwise place its
property in the charge of Heritage?

(5)

Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and
mortgagee, have an overmastering influence over Five F?
If so, did Heritage use that influence unlawfully?

(6)

Did Five F, with Heritage's understanding, repose a
continuous trust in the skill and integrity of Heritage, above
and beyond the borrower-lender relationship?

(7)

Were the note and trust deed negotiated at arm's length?
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(8)

Did Five F request Heritage as trustee to consult with it in
any respect?

(9)

Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F?

(10)

If Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, was
Five F injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee?

(11)

If Five F was injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee, what
damages did it suffer?

(12)

If someone else had been substituted to act as trustee under
the trust deed, would the outcome of the trustee's sales
have been altered in any way?

(13)

By the time the foreclosure sales were conducted, had the
relationship between Heritage and Five F become
"adversarial," such that any fiduciary duties that may have
existed were extinguished?

b.

Breach of Contract Claim
(1)

Did Heritage breach the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing?
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(2)

Did Five F expressly agree in its confirmed Chapter 11 plan
that, in the event Heritage was not paid in full by May 31,
1998, it could proceed with a trustee sale on the 10.4 acre
parcel and then, if the proceeds from the trustee sale did not
pay in full the Note, it could conduct a foreclosure sale of
the four-plex?

(3)

Under the operation of the trust deed and trust deed statute,
was Heritage paid the amount of the proceeds of the trustee
sale or some other amount?

(4)

Did Five F have a justified expectation under its contract
with Heritage, i.e., the promissory note, trust deed, and
confirmed Chapter 11 plan, that if Heritage bid at the
trustee sale, it would bid an amount for the 10.4 acre parcel
equal to or greater than the fair market value, or the amount
of any appraisal it had in its possession?

(5)

Did Five F have a justified expectation that Heritage would
not foreclose, under any circumstances, on all of its
collateral?

(a)

Did Five F ever disclose this expectation to
Heritage?
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(b)

Did Five F deliberately fail to disclose this
expectation to Heritage to induce Heritage to make
the loan?

(c)

Was Heritage "paid in full" by its foreclosure on the
10.44 acre parcel?

(6)

Did Five F have a justified expectation that in the event of
foreclosure its collateral would not be sold at the Trustee's
Sale to the highest bidder, which amount would be applied
to its debt?

(7)

Would the obligations that Five F seeks to enforce against
Heritage result in a better contract for Five F than the
contract that Five F actually entered into with Heritage?

(8)

Is Five F attempting to establish new, independent rights or
duties that were not created in the parties' contract, or
agreed by Heritage?

(9)

In connection with the two foreclosure sales, did Heritage
fully comply with all provisions of the trust deed and the
foreclosure statute?
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(10)

Did Five F have a justifiable expectation that Heritage
would consult with it about and agree upon Five F's
position on the calculation of the bids it presented at the
trustee sales?

(11)

Did Five F suffer damages as a result of any breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(12)

What damages, if any, were suffered by Five F as a result
of any breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing?

c.

Unjust Enrichment Claim
(1)

Was there an express contract governing the rights of
Heritage and Five F in the event of a default on the Note by
Five F?

(2)

Did Five F confer a benefit upon Heritage through
Heritage's exercise of its contractual foreclosure rights?

(3)

If so, at the time such benefit was conferred, was Heritage
aware of the benefit?
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(4)

Under the circumstances, would it be inequitable for
Heritage to retain any benefit received through its exercise
of its contractual foreclosure rights?

(5)

Did Five F engage in inequitable conduct to induce
Heritage to enter into the contracts or otherwise engage in
inequitable conduct?

G.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to

those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are:
1.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
a.

Whether Heritage as trustee under the trust deed between Heritage

Bank and Five F owed Five F a fiduciary duty.
b.

Whether Heritage breached that duty by failing to act in the

interest of Five F and to accord itself with a high punctilio of honor.
c.

Whether Heritage's conduct was consistent with Five F's justified

expectations under Five F's promissory note and trust deed with Heritage.
d.

Whether Five F's confirmed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan is a bar

to the instant action.
e.

Whether Heritage's duty under the Trust Deed is greater than the

mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default
provision of the Trust Deed.
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f.

Whether Heritage's conduct in foreclosing on Five F's property

comported with all requirements of Utah law.
g.

2.

Whether Heritage has been unjustly enriched.

DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
a.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F as
trustor when its only relation with Five F was as a lender
negotiating with Five F at arm's length?

(2)

In light of Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-27(l)(1988), did
Heritage as trustee have any duty to consult with Five F
about the trustee sale other than as to "the order in which
the trust property shall be sold?"

(3)

Did Heritage as Trustee owe a fiduciary duty to Five F as
trustor under the facts of this case?

(4)

After the relationship between Heritage and Five F had
turned adversarial, did Heritage owe any fiduciary duty to
Five F?

(5)

Can a trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the
collateral property or its disposition after the trustee sale?
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(6)

Can Five F now seek punitive damages under its breach of
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages
or allege wanton, intentional or reckless conduct in its
complaint?

(7)

Can Five F now seek lost profits under its breach of
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages
and absent expert testimony, evidence of profits of similar
businesses or evidence of subsequent profits?

b.

Breach of Contract Claim
(1)

Did Heritage as lender or beneficiary have a contractual
duty to bid at the trustee sale of the 10.4 acre parcel?

(2)

If Heritage decided to bid on the 10.4 acre parcel, did it
have a contractual duty to bid the fair market value of the
parcel or the amount of an appraisal in its possession?

(3)

Was Heritage as beneficiary entitled to bid an amount at the
trustee sale on the 10.4 acre parcel that it determined
necessary to avoid any risk of loss or protect its own
interests?

(4)

Is the note, trust deed and bankruptcy plan ambiguous in
any material respect? Is parol evidence of Five F's
21

purported expectations admissible where those expectations
are nowhere reflected in the promissory note, trust deed, or
confirmed plan?
(5)

As a matter of law, could Five F have a justified
expectation as to what would be bid or accepted at the
trustee sale other than the highest bid?

(6)

Once the trustee sale under the deed of trust occurred, if it
complied with all statutory requirements, were Five F's
rights fully extinguished with respect to the property sold?

(7)

Can the trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the
collateral property or its disposition after the Trustee sale?

(8)

Does the party's contract in this case - that is, the
promissory note, trust deed, and confirmed Chapter 11 plan
- specifically authorize Heritage to foreclose against the
10.4 acre parcel and then, if not paid in full from that sale,
foreclose against the four-plex and acquire both at the
foreclosure sales by credit bid, thus precluding any claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a matter of law?
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(9)

By conducting the two separate foreclosure sales in
accordance with the terms of the confirmed chapter 11
plan, was Heritage simply exercising its express contractual
rights, thus precluding the assertion of any claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(10)

Do the obligations that Five F seeks to imply, through the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, result in a
better contract for Five F than the contract that was actually
entered into with Heritage and proposed by Five F in its
chapter 11 plan, thus precluding the assertion of any claim
for breach of implied covenant?

(11)

By pursuing this claim is Five F attempting to establish
new, independent rights or duties, that were not created in
the parties' contract, or agreed to by Heritage?

(12)

Where Heritage fully complied with all provisions of the
Note, Trust Deed, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan and trust
deed foreclosure statute, can it be held liable for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

(13)

May Five F introduce evidence of lost profits when it did
not pray for such damages and absent expert testimony,
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evidence of profits of similar businesses or evidence of
subsequent profits?
(14)

May Five F introduce evidence on Heritage's internal rate
of return with respect to its breach of contract claim?

c.

Unjust Enrichment Claim
(1)

As a matter of law, can Five F bring a claim for unjust
enrichment where there is an express contract governing
the rights of Heritage and Five F in the event of a default
on the Note by Five F?

(2)

Was Heritage unjustly enriched through its exercise of its
contractually agreed upon foreclosure rights?

(3)

Does Five F's inequitable conduct in inducing Heritage to
make the loan preclude it from obtaining the equitable
remedy of unjust enrichment?

d.

Other
(1)

Is Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan a bar to any or all of
Five F's claims under a theory of judicial estoppel?
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(2)

As a matter of law, can Five F attack the validity of the
Plan of Reorganization it successfully advanced in its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding?

(3)

Did the Plan of Reorganization, advanced by Five F and
adopted by the bankruptcy court, give Heritage the legal
right to foreclose on the second parcel if it was not "paid in
full" by foreclosure on the first parcel?

(4)

Under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may Five
F recover alleged damages consisting of lost profits and
loss of good will, when such alleged damages were not
specifically prayed for in Five F's Amended Complaint?

(5)

As a matter of law, if Five F's obligation to Heritage under
the Note was not satisfied by the proceeds of the first
trustee sale, was it entitled to proceed with the trustee sale
on the second parcel?

H.

ATTORNEYS' FEES. The parties reserve their arguments, if any, regarding their

right to attorneys' fees and their entitlement to attorneys' fees for later presentation to the Court.
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I.

EXHIBITS
1.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS. Five F's exhibits will be provided to Heritage

by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m.
2.

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS. Heritage's exhibits will be provided to Five

F by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m.
3.

EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF COURT CLERK. Exhibits received in

evidence and placed in the custody of the clerk may be withdrawn from the
clerk's office upon signing of receipts therefor by the respective parties offering
them. The exhibits shall be returned to the clerk's office within a reasonable time
and in the meantime shall be available for inspection at the request of other
parties.
4.

EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF PARTIES. Exhibits identified and

offered that remain in the custody of the party offering them shall be made
available for review by the offering party to any other party to the action that
requests access to them in writing.
5.

AUTHENTICITY. The parties shall file any objection to the authenticity

of proposed exhibits not later than five business days from receipt of an exhibit.
The proposed exhibits are subject to all other objections, if any, by an opposing
party at the trial.
6.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS. If exhibits other than those exchanged

on the date stated above are to be offered, the existence of which could not have
reasonably been anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least
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72 hours before their introduction at trial. The opposing party reserves its right to
object to such exhibits, outside the presence of the jury, by objection at trial or on
motion.
7.

IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITS. Any exhibits to be used for

impeachment of a witness called by an opposing party that are not otherwise
disclosed pursuant to another part of this Order to the extent their use can be
reasonably anticipated, shall be submitted to opposing counsel by 5:00 p.m. on
the day preceding their proposed use, provided that the Court may permit use of
such exhibits on shorter notice upon a showing of good cause. The foregoing
does not apply to the use of documents for impeachment purposes that a party
does not intend to offer as an exhibit. A party may object to the admission of an
exhibit introduced pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph upon a showing of
undue surprise and prejudice caused by the failure of the proponent to disclose its
intended use of the document earlier.
8.

DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS.
a.

Enlargement of Exhibits. Each party may, for demonstrative

purposes, enlarge any exhibit, provided that (i) a copy of the exhibit to be
enlarged has been provided to opposing counsel; (ii) the exhibit has been
properly offered into evidence; and (iii) the exhibit has been received by
the Court. Each party reserves the right to object to use of any exhibit that
has been enlarged. Enlarged exhibits shall be used during the trial only
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and will not be received into evidence and will not accompany the jury
into the jury room, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties.
b.

Other Demonstrative Exhibits. The parties need not exchange or

identify demonstrative exhibits at the time that the parties exchange other
exhibits on October 5, 2001. If a party intends to use a demonstrative
exhibit at trial, it shall provide 24 hours notice to the opposing party so
that objections, if any, to the use of the proposed demonstrative exhibit
can be made and those objections resolved by the Court not later than the
afternoon preceding the day on which the proposed demonstrative exhibit
is to be used.
c.

Summaries of Voluminous Documents. Documents that

constitute summaries pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which may be
offered in evidence, also need not be identified at the time the parties
exchange other exhibits on October 5, 2001. However, the categories of
source documents for such potential summaries should be exchanged by
the parties on October 5, 2001. Such documents shall be numbered as
exhibits. The parties shall provide copies of such summaries that they
intend to offer as exhibits on or before October 15, 2001. The parties may
seek exceptions from the Court for good cause.
9.

USE OF EXHIBITS BY OTHER PARTY. Each party reserves the

right to offer into evidence an exhibit identified by any other party.
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10.

NUMBERING OF EXHIBITS. Five F may number its proposed

exhibits beginning "P-l" and continuing with the use of consecutive numbers.
Heritage may number its proposed exhibits beginning with the letter "D" followed
by the next consecutive number after the last number used by Five F.

WITNESSES.
1.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary:
a.

b.

c.

Plaintiff will call as lay witnesses:
1.

Ray Fowler

2.

William T. Thurman

3.

Brian Chadaz

4.

Daniel Johnson

5.

Randy Rynearson

6.

Stan McConkie

Plaintiff may call as lay witnesses:
1.

Cathy Fowler

2.

Brent Beesley

3.

Thomas Rich

4.

Any witness called by Defendant

Expert witnesses Plaintiff will call at trial
1.

Derk Rasmussen, RGL Gallagher
136 East So. Temple, Suite 1770
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-0400
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d.

Expert witnesses Plaintiff may call at trial
1.

2.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary2:
a.

b.

c.

2

John KLBushnell, MAI
3446 Chaparral Drive
St. George, Utah 84790

Defendant will call as lay witnesses:
1.

Brent Beesley

2.

Brian Chadaz

3.

Raymond Fowler

4.

Bill Thurman

Defendant may call as lay witnesses:
1.

Kathy Fowler

2.

Kerry Soper

3.

Gary Esplin, City Manager, St. George, Utah

4.

Tom Rich

5.

Any witness subpoenaed by plaintiff

6.

Any witness listed by plaintiff

7.

Any witness called by plaintiff

Defendant will call as expert witnesses:
1.

Merrill Norman

2.

David Thomas

The parties reserve the right to call any witness listed here by deposition if such witness is unavailable.
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d.

Defendant may call as expert witnesses:
1.

e.
3.

None at this time.

Defendant may call other rebuttal witnesses as needed.

Testimony Offered by Deposition. A party intending to present

testimony by deposition shall designate the portions of the deposition testimony to
be presented not later than October 12, 2001. Cross-designations to such
depositions shall be made not later than October 17, 2001. Further crossdesignations may be made upon reasonable notice to the opposing party, and in
any event prior to trial. Exceptions may be made upon stipulation of the parties or
by the Court for good cause shown.
4.

Other Witnesses. In the event that witnesses other than those listed are to

be called to testify at the trial, a statement of their names, addresses, and the
general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing counsel on
or before October 17, 2001. This restriction shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses
whose testimony, where required, cannot be reasonably anticipated before the
time of trial.
5.

Notice of Witnesses. Each party will provide to the other party two days

advance notice of the witnesses (including witnesses whose testimony being
offered by deposition), and the order in which it intends to call those witnesses on
each trial day, subject to any unforeseeable changes in the length or scheduling of
witnesses.
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K.

REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. Requests for instructions to the jury and

special requests for voir dire examination of the jury will be submitted on October 17, 2001,
subject to further rulings of the Court. The parties reserve the right to supplement their proposed
jury instructions, and such supplementation shall be submitted to opposing counsel and the Court
no later than October 22,2001. The parties shall submit two hard copy versions of proposed jury
instructions: one with annotations, and the other without annotations, and also shall bring to trial
these proposed jury instructions on computer discs, in Corel WordPerfect 8 format.

L.

TRIAL BRIEF. The parties may submit a trial brief to the Court and to opposing

counsel by October 18, 2001.

M.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. Five F filed its First Amended Complaint

on May 11,1999. The deadline for amending pleadings as established by the Court has expired.
There were no other requests to amend pleadings.

N.

DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed.

O.

PENDING MOTIONS. The following motions are pending in whole or in part:
1.
Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Damages Claims, which the Court took
under advisement.
2.
Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Certain Accounting Documents For The
Five F Loan And Documents Produced By Deloitte & Touche, issues on which
the Court reserved until the time of trial.
3.
The Court took under advisement the issue of whether Plaintiff could seek
punitive damages.
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P.

JUROR NOTEBOOKS. At the commencement of deliberations, each juror may

be provided with a notebook containing materials mutually agreed to by the parties, or otherwise
ordered by the Court. The cost of such notebooks shall be borne by both parties equally.
Q.

SPECIAL VERDICT. The parties will submit a special verdict form to the

Court on October 19, 2001.
R.

TRIAL SETTING. The case is set for a jury trial on October 22-26,2001 at 9:00

a.m. at the Fifth Judicial District Courthouse, Washington County, Utah. Counsel for both parties
shall arrive the first day of trial at 8:45 a.m.
S.

MODIFICATIONS TO PRETRIAL ORDER. The parties may request a

modification of this order as a result of any subsequent rulings by the Court and/or intervening
events that necessitate modification of this order.
T.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. Possibility of settlement is considered poor.

DATED this l(

~"day of October, 2001.
BY THE COURT

J. Philip Eves
District Court Judge
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The foregoing proposed pretrial order (prior to execution by the court) is hereby adopted this
day of October, 2001.

614360v3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PROPOSED

/ / ^h

PRETRIAL ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ? b '"day of October, 2001 to the
following:
Benson L. Hathaway
Aimee K. Martinez
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
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